Caracas Chronicles

Your incredible capability of fooling yourself and your readers never ceases to amaze me. You base your ridiculously optimistic predictions on the 2007 constitutional referendum. Why not on the last referendum held in February 2009? Not so favorable, eh?
In addition your base data was after a huge abstntion. Assuming that absention will be so high is just another self-deception.

If you honestly believe that the opposition will go from zero seats in 2005 to 83 seats in 2010 then you are really, really, really seriously deranged and replete with self-decpetion.

John Evers

Just found out via Twitter - there seems to be an agreement that there will be primaries in Anzoategui. This is great news.

Many thanks, Quico, for your heroic efforts turning hard-to-obtain data into useful strategic information.

Great data, great maps, great analysis.

There are 167 diputies for the national assembly.
Isn´nt the magic number is 84, one more than 83.
84+83= 167
Thank you, mmfc

I did the rather tedious effort of compiling everything based on the 2009 enmienda data (since when I did everything the first time the 2007 reforma data had not been released), and the results ARE quite similar. The opposition would need around 53-54% of the vote to get a majority, and the distribution of votes appears highly similar.

To answer some of your questions, based on 2009 data Barquisimeto is very much a possible pickup. Based on a uniform swing to bring the 2009 result to a benchmark 50-50, the chavista margin is around 4%, larger than you postulate but still very doable. 2009 data brings Maracaibo 8 to leaning oppo, though Falcon Oeste would be unachievable. Both Caracas and Táchira have become more oppo since 2007, Táchira in particular is entirely oppo under 50-50. On the other hand Bolívar was around 2% more chavista in 2009 than in 2007, so I would judge those pickups more unlikely. In conlcusion, compared to 2009, the overall scenario described is mostly correct, but probably skewed in favour of the opposition due to chavista abstention in 2007.

Quico,

Many thanks for doing such meticulous work, this has been an eye opener for me.

I really hope the opposition leaders pay attention and focus on the key circuits. The again, that maybe like asking for peras from the "horno", to quote the great exile. I think in the end, given the many limitations of the opposition movement, the campaign will have a national focus, with little additional time or effort spent on the key circunscripciones...

IMHO, maybe the focus should be on the counting/defense of the votes rater than the campaigning per se. Just to give you one locally-flavored example: In the case of the municipio Colon, which I think makes up most of the Catatumbo circuit, the opposition could have won the last election for mayor had it not split into two factions. However even with the split, it was an extremely close race. According to the locals, the opposition candidate was leading the vote tally up to the last minute, when a mysterious ballot box appeared out of nowhere, filled with PSUV votes.

These type of tactics, which have always existed in Venezuela, are more likely to make a difference when the election is close, which reinforces the need for "parapeos" and vote defenders in those key places.

predicts that in states where males of fighting age 15-29 are econo/socially "superfluous" and represent at least 30% of the population, civil war ensues. The 15-29 age group is the most prone to adopt a daydreaming "fantasy ideology" like the "Bolivar Guevara Complex" and other radical religious frameworks. Venezuela's youth bulge seems to be past its peak but still...: 30% of the population falls into the 10-29 bracket --the 10-15 age bracket might be included because that's how young the young are when they start killing in the barrios of Caracas. That's at the national level. Civil war may not be relevant but electoral disruption is, especially this year, given the coming electricity crisis and all that it implies. One might begin by looking at barrios where this age group is proportionately highest...

If you divide the fighting age male population 10-29 by the working population 15-60 the numbers come out as:

2001 census 31%
1990 census 34%
1981 census 37%
1971 census 38%

the tendency is for the youth bulge to go down, though it's still preety high.