Seeing April 11th with Fresh Eyes
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On the eighth anniversary of the April 11th, 2002 coup, Brian Nelson - author of the most carefully researched history of the April Crisis in print today - contributes this reflection on what happened that day. La versión en español está aquí.
Some days you just can’t think about what’s happening in Venezuela. It’s too depressing. But if you are reading this, then today is not one of those days for you. And that’s something. Because today is the anniversary of the coup that briefly ousted Hugo Chávez in 2002. It's a time to reflect, to remember, re-see the coup, especially if you were in Venezuela at the time. I know it isn’t easy, but it’s important. It’s important to make yourself look.
I’ve heard it said that everyone was a chavista once. Well, April 11th is the reason I switched from being a Chávez supporter to a critic.
I could tell (very early on, in fact) by the way that the government reacted to the coup—the way it suspended the truth commission, fired detectives and prosecutors, by its political spin—that it had something to hide. I wanted to find out what. Then, in the process of talking to eyewitnesses and the families of victims, something happened. It became very personal.
I don't mean that in a Dirty Harry way; it's not about payback. I mean it in the way that sets a headline (“19 dead, 150 wounded”) apart from something that touches you, deeply, to the point that you cannot look away or forget.
That's what happens when you meet five, ten, fifteen people who have been shot. When you meet the parents of teenagers who were killed…parents who have no legal recourse, no way to find justice. It changes you. Especially when you go back and interview each of them four and five times and you find all your skepticism and detachment melting away. If you decide to let it in, then it will change you, too. (Not letting it in is safer, and maybe even smarter.)
If you've read my book, then you know I think it is important to understand events from all possible perspectives and that I, of course, empathize with the victims on both sides. I even understand why the government did what it did to stop the march. Yet a line must still be drawn. To empathize is not to condone actions that are clearly wrong.
So what is the Chávez government hiding? Why, eight years later, have we had no truth commission, no independent investigation, and why does the government refuse to admit any delegation from the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights?
It took a very long time to figure it out—to sort through the piles of seemingly random video clips, photographs, and newspaper articles—to make any sense out of it. Honestly, if you’d told me how long it was going to take when I started, I would have given up.
But little by little, April 11th sucked me in; and little by little I put the pieces together. Three years into my researching and writing I would still occasionally hit a critical turning point—an “ah-ha” moment—when three, four, or five different pieces all suddenly fit together.
One of those moments was figuring out who had been killed first and where they had been shot from—critical pieces for interpreting all that would follow.
Many of the first eyewitnesses that I interviewed thought that the photographer Jorge Tortoza (who was at the head of the opposition march) was the first fatality. It was hard to know because often within seconds of being shot, many victims were picked up by friends and bystanders and carried away.
Two important sources convinced me that another opposition marcher, Jesús Arellano, had been killed first, just a few minutes before Jorge Tortoza. One source was a Chávez supporter, Douglas Romero, who accidentally wound up in the anti-Chávez crowd and witnessed the killing of Jesús Arellano first, then Tortoza. The other piece of evidence was Tortoza’s camera—his last shots were of the dying Arellano. Discovering that Arellano was the first fatality was enormously important because his death was captured on film and he was clearly shot from the pro-Chávez crowd.
Pro-Chávez militants killed the first victim. The video evidence is clear. The first casualties were shot neither from the top of Puente Llaguno nor by snipers on rooftops, as conventional wisdom would come to believe, but rather from street level, from Avenida Baralt itself, just before 2:30 p.m. - when the two groups were much closer to each other than they would be for the rest of the day.
Of course, the fact that the first fatalities were caused by the pro-Chávez gunmen has tremendous implications for the ensuing coup. It completely undermines the government's narrative about a premeditated plan on the part of the opposition to cause violence as a pretext for a military intervention.
Another “ah-ha” moment was the realization that the National Guard must have been ordered not to interfere with the Bolivarian Circles as they repelled the march on Baralt Avenue.
The Venezuelan government and its apologists have tried very hard to cover this up, depicting the violence as something beyond anyone’s control. For example, Greg Wilpert of Venezuelanalysis, wrote, “Chávez could rely on only a small handful of National Guard troops, who stopped the opposition's advance on two of the three streets leading to Miraflores.” Baralt Avenue, where the majority of the deaths occurred, was the third street that Wilpert refers to, suggesting that if there had only been more National Guard troops, then things would not have turned so ugly.
But Wilpert is misinformed. Not only were there plenty of National Guard troops around Miraflores that day, but they were actually deployed, en masse, on Baralt Avenue. They sat there all afternoon, watching a four-hour gun battle and did nothing to stop it. Which brings new credence to reports that Chávez and his cabinet had discussed deploying the Bolivarian Circles in conjunction with the National Guard four days before the march.
It was an anti-Chávez marcher, Andrés Trujillo, who first told me that he had seen National Guard troops standing on the side streets of Baralt Avenue and that those troops prevented people from getting out of the crossfire. I had been skeptical at first, but then a pro-Chávez eyewitness, Carolina Campos, told me the same thing.
Searching through the thousands of photographs I had stored up, I eventually found pictures of these troops. There they were, right on Baralt Avenue, sometimes only feet from the pro-Chávez gunmen, and they did nothing to stop the violence. They didn’t help the police and they didn’t hinder the pro-Chávez gunmen.
These are two just two important pieces of the April 11 puzzle. Obviously there are many more, and many involve criminal activity from the opposition, too. But it is clear that it is the Chávez government who has the most to hide and the most to lose from an independent investigation.
In many ways the government’s reaction to the violence is much more telling than the violence itself. The government had a choice: it could have jailed the gunmen and National Guard troops who were caught on film and in photographs shooting at the marchers. This would have provided some reconciliation for the victims and proven that the government applies the law equally to all citizens. It did not choose that route. Instead, it began building up lies on top of lies to protect itself.
I suspect that the government feels that it has to lie, simply because the stakes are so high. After all, former Venezuelan president Carlos Andréz Pérez was impeached simply for sending campaign funds to a candidate in Nicaragua. How would Chávez look if a proper investigation were held into the violence on April 11th? Another reason why keeping control of the National Assembly is so important. Rest assured that Chávez has thought of this. I’m sure he’s also thought of former Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori, who is in jail for complicity in the killing of his opponents in Peru.
Obviously, many things are driving Hugo Chávez—his ardent belief in socialism, his distrust of the United States and the West, and his desire to become a legendary figure who can unite Latin America at least as well as his political muse, Simón Bolívar. But as someone who has studied Chávez’s record on human rights, I believe his fear of incarceration is also a factor. His repeated (and finally successful) attempts to change the constitution to allow for his indefinite re-election may be viewed through this lens. Yes, Hugo Chávez wanted to end term limits so that his revolution could continue, but I believe he also wanted to end term limits to protect himself from prosecution should he lose power.
It’s a crazy thing, April 11th. Eight years later it’s still with us. In the headlines. It’s the reason Zuloaga was arrested and the excuse that Chávez will likely give when Globovision is finally shut down. Yet it is an event that most people still know very little about. I mean, what really happened down there, around Miraflores? We are still trying to put the pieces together a little bit at a time.
Brian Nelson
For this anniversary, Brian has published a bunch of new material on the coup on his website, including this important account of the Otto Neustaldt sub-saga. Check it out.
Also, if you haven't yet, you really should read Brian's book.
NicaCat56
Francisco Toro
Vinz
Nice report
Thank you for your summary, in particular for someone who could not get your book yet. CADIVI, you know.....
I have a little silly point of detail: some of us NEVER were chavista. Since 1992 for that matter. I was even in the tiny 10 % who voted NO in the referendum of April 1999 understanding very well that constitutions are only as good as the people who apply them.
:-)
Thanks
And two things:
1) I agree with Daniel that not everyone was Chavista. The first time Chavistas were not even from one given social class.
2) It would be nice if someone translated this post into Spanish.
I really hope your book gets translated into Spanish.
Translation
Someone translated it into Spanish.Is a very good translation. I'm writing here the link:
http://cuentosintrascendentes.blogspot.com/2010/04/las-pistas-del-11-de-...
Typo
"Not only were there plenty of National Guard troops around Miraflores that day, but they were actually deployed, en mass, on Baralt Avenue".
This is french --> "en masse".
Cheers
Not Chavista, but sympathizer
I will play Devil's advocate here and say that what I believe Brian meant that everyone in this country in a certain way and at some point sympathized with the primary ideas of chavismo.
For myself, I am not a chavista, never was and never will. I cannot trust someone who decides to resort to violence to throw away an elected government, and that creates a movement that revolves around division and hate.
But, on the other hand, everyone felt that a change was needed from the old establishment, and that inclusion, opportunities for the needy and the like had to be present in this country. That is not being a chavista, but I would suppose that this is what Brian is trying to transmit.
It is a shame that the majority of this country decided to put its faith in Chavez, probably believing that he was the Messiah. At some point, someone has to study how we Venezuelans are fond of quick solutions and messianism.
I refuse to say that is "chavismo"
I never voted for AD, never for COPEI or the Chiripero. I very much wanted a change, I rejected the corruption, the lack of thought on sustainable development, the social injustice, the lack of accountability.
That does not have anything, anything to do with Chavismo.
Chavismo is simply wrong even based on its name. How can a movement be called after a living person? How can Venezuela be based on a movement brought about by bloody coup mongers who had Pérez Jiménez as one of their models? (Chávez actually went to Spain and saw Pérez and later invited him to Venezuela for the inauguration). How can it be based on a personality cult? On lack of open debate and pluralism?
Sorry, but Chávez did not invent the "thoughts about the poor".
Did Chavismo claim to be "for the poor"? Sure. I don't know what movements have ever claimed to be against the poor. I know what was the oil price average for years and I know how that matters in a country living off oil only.
Initially a lot of Chavez voters were low middle class, like some of my relatives, not from the poorest. They very quickly fell out of love with the regime. At the same time they were falling out of love, millions of poor, who before were not very interested, went for it. The petrodollars saw to it (12.8 in 1998, 24.36 in 2002, $40 per barrel in 2004).
Still: in every group there were people who never bought that crap.
Not a very major majority
"It is a shame that the majority of this country decided to put its faith in Chavez"
Actually, the idea that Chavez was immensely popular from the start is mostly an urban legend. The two elections he actually won legally (1998 and 2000) have the two highest abstention rates in the history of Venezuelan presidential elections (well over 40%, compared with a historical average of about 10%). In 98, he got less total votes than Lusinchi got in 83 and CAP got in 88.
popularity
I am trying to find some info to back up this but is proving hard, so I will rely on my memory. Not everyone was Chavista, but when he won the first time and gave that really conciliatory message in an interview, wearing a suit and being “manso como un corderito” the next day his approval rate was over 90% if I remember correctly. People, even the ones that did not vote for him, decided to give him a chance. People who did not support him probably thought “maybe he can be the change we need after all”… So in that sense for a brief period of time at least a vast majority was chavista.
New Material on Brian's Website
For this anniversary, Brian has published a bunch of new material on the coup on his website, including this important account of the Otto Neustaldt sub-saga. Check it out.
"Otto Neustaldt was a correspondent for CNN at the time of the coup. During the violence on April 11 he recorded a press conference by a group of high-ranking Venezuelan officers led by Admiral Hector Ramírez Pérez. In this press conference the officers denounced Chávez's role in the violence and mentioned that there had been several deaths.
"The problem arose when Neustaldt mistakenly reported that the officers made this announcement before any deaths had actually occurred. Even though this was contradicted by other journalists from the very beginning, it caused a controversy because it seemed to suggest that the violence was started by the military and not the Chávez government. Why? The logic here was that if Admiral Hector Ramírez Pérez knew about deaths before they occurred, then the military must have had a plot to kill people all along.
"But Neustaldt was wrong—the first deaths had occurred over an hour before the press conference. The generals knew there were deaths, but Neustaldt did not. The first recording of the announcement (there were two) was taped just about the same time that Chávez started his special broadcast at 3:45 p.m. However, the first fatality occured between 2:15 and 2:30 p.m. when Jesús Arellano was killed on Baralt Avenue. The photographer Jorge Tortoza was killed shortly after, right around 2:30 p.m. (Shots of the dying Arellano were the last pictures on Tortoza’s camera.)
"There were at least 75 minutes for the officers to hear about the first deaths. In fact, Venezuelan journalists Alfredo Meza and Sandra La Fuente reported in their excellent book on the coup “El acertijo de abril” (The Riddle of April) that someone called out Tortoza’s name as one of the dead before the taping of the first press conference began.
"So it is clear that Otto Neustald was mistaken about the time that the first fatalities occurred. (How could he know when the shooting started? He was on the other side of Caracas.) Unfortunately, Neustaldt's story was enthusiastically embraced by the Venezuelan government and has become one of their "Talking Points" about the coup because it fits their spin on events—it points to a military conspiracy that absolves the government of responsibility for the violence."
more simple than that
Socialism, distrust of the west, emulating Simon Bolivar are all a ruse. Chavez is only about staying in power and you are correct, staying out of jail is a leading driver. I think another driver is emulating Castro, rather than Bolivar, and commanding the airwaves, writing newspaper articles, and even blogging as these feed his grossly overinflated ego. I really do believe he's pretty much that simple.....and if helping his friends and family become rich in the process, well, that's just one of the perks of power.
Here's my translation
Liberally and without permission, but here's the post in Spanish.
http://cuentosintrascendentes.blogspot.com/2010/04/las-pistas-del-11-de-...
Now with my name, here's my translation
http://cuentosintrascendentes.blogspot.com/2010/04/las-pistas-del-11-de-...
Thank you, Bruni!
I've added a link to your translation to the opening paragraph.
pd: eres una chinche que no acepta invitaciones!
Thanks Quico
Thanks for the link.
PD. Claro que acepto! Try again.
From the moment I first heard an audio clip ..
of Chávez speaking, I thought that in the main, he was way too squirrelly. Yes, he had a few good ideas that really made sense. But the message wasn't consistent enough. Was it at the expense of all those cafecitos? Or did Chávez simply have ADHD? I wasn't sure. Later on, on Telelatino - I believe it was before his election in 1998, I saw him interviewed by a very serious Mexican journalist - wish I could remember his name, or had the video clip. In that interview, Chávez' squirrelliness had intensified. Later, I soon saw/heard/read about what I realized were plants abroad, who trotted out their support, some wearing red berets during Chávez' foreign charm offences.
Frankly, the VIO did a superb snow job. If accolades were given for the best marketing, the VIO would take first prize in creating smoke and mirrors. Their efforts were topped by the two Marxist Irish filmmakers who *just happened* to be filming in Miraflores - at night - on April 11th.
So, no, I was never a chavista, Mr. Nelson. But the opposition didn't inspire any loyalty, either. As a result, I didn't vote in that election. Had I done so, my vote abroad would have been treated seriously, I believe, unlike subsequent voting exercises at the Venezuelan consulate.
In the next two years, as I became more acutely aware of the danger that Chávez represented, I made sure to vote, even though I soon realized that Venezuelan votes, abroad, were not respected. But still. I can't condone those who ensured their political opinions were heard - some even crafting themselves into pundits - but who never bothered to exercise their civic responsibility, or prepare to do the same.
Once again, smoke and mirrors ruled the day. Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose.
Holy smoke.One Chavista trumps 100 plus opposition
Well said Syd, Daniel and Kepler.
I heard it said that it is fatal to be right when the rest of the world is wrong, but you can't have a democracy without an informed people.
I was never a Chavista either,mostly because while I always thought we needed justice for the poor and disconnected, i don't trust someone like Chavez to administer that justice.He spews too much hatred and grandiosity so for me it was as simple as that.I didn't need proof.I relied on my gut instinct which usually does me well.
From day one, I went to the principal of my school where I worked and told her that it was my last year,and that I was getting out to protect my daughter and that in my opinion it was "salvase quien pueda" ...
so not liking that one bit, she threw me a most skeptical look.She had a 'wait and see' attitude;Her son was living in England at the time.
I just recently received an email from a very trusted coworker telling me that NOW the teachers have to hide their thoughts because ONE of the teachers is a Chavista.They get together and talk but have to shut up when she arrives.This is clearly not a democracy. Just imagine:
One Chavista trumps '100 plus' non- Chavista teachers....holy smoke
Did Chávez order the shooting of opposition marchers?
Sometimes I get the sense that April 11th is like the rabbit hole in Alice in Wonderland: more than taking an interest in it, you can fall into it never to be heard from again. It makes your head spin. But there's something compulsive about it.
One question we should face head on has to do with the claim that Chávez gave the order to shoot on the march.
From Brian's evidence, it's really hard to know what to make of it. Just looking at those images, it's easy to see that the vast majority of the pro-Chávez demonstrators on the upper part of Baralt Avenue are not armed. They seem to be throwing rocks, mostly. And there's really no way to know what orders, if any, the armed guys were going on.
Certainly, it's hard to interpret what we see as a kind of paramilitary action, an organized manouver by an organized group using military tactics. It just looks like a bunch of armed yahoos some of whom decided to pop off a few rounds into the other crowd.
The order we know Chávez did give - to activate Plan Avila - is just as problematic. Certainly the decision was extremely risky, for all the reasons we have discussed here before. But there are a million ways the army might have reacted on the ground had that order been followed: a bloodbath - while likely - was not the only possible outcome, and there's no way to be sure that's what Chávez was intending.
I support the decision by Rosendo and Vásquez Velasco not to follow that order. But I don't think it's right to describe the order as EQUIVALENT to ordering the army to shoot at the oppo march.
After all, drinking half a bottle of gin and then going out driving fast in a street where many children like to play outside is an extremely risky behavior: criminal and contemptible without any doubt. If my friend is about to engage in that kind of behavior, I have a moral obligation to try to stop him.
But deciding to drink half a bottle of gin and then drive too fast in a residential area is not the same thing as deciding to run over a bunch of kids. It just isn't, and the opposition doesn't strengthen its case by pretending it is.
The Venezuelan army isn't a G.I.JOE cartoon
"But there are a million ways the army might have reacted on the ground had that order been followed: a bloodbath - while likely - was not the only possible outcome, and there's no way to be sure that's what Chávez was intending."
The venezuelan army doesn't have ballenas, tear gas, rubber pellets or anything to deter anyone like the National Guard does. Everything the army has is intended to kill people. They are not peace keepers, they're trained assassins.
Like Brian says, the National Guard was there yet they did nothing that could have led to a peaceful conclusion. The fact that the peace-keepers never even tried to keep the peace before Chavez decided to send the killers tells you everything you need to know about what Chavez intended to do with the march.
I agree, there's a lot of circumstantial evidence...
...it certainly doesn't look good for Chávez on the ordering-shots-fired front. It's really not difficult to build a circumstantial case to defend the thesis that he ordered the shooting of the opposition march. But it's also possible to construct a series of different scenarios that are not implausible, and that fit with the available evidence.
We can't come to a definitive conclusion from the evidence available. Personally, my interpretation is that the orders were much more vague than a straightforward order to shoot up the oppo march. I can easily envision a kind of "do what you have to do to make sure the opposition can't reach the palace." Which is damning enough on its own that there's no real need to go further into the realm of unsubstantiated assertion.
Orders were vague????
Quico sez: "Personally, my interpretation is that the orders were much more vague than a straightforward order to shoot up the oppo march. I can easily envision a kind of "do what you have to do to make sure the opposition can't reach the palace.""
Do you think the army holds candy-assed academics (no offense, Juan!) who have the time to debate the infinite possibilities of an action?
Good grief. We're talking Army, here, Quico. The president gives an order. It's got to be crystal clear. General(s) put into action, also in crystal clear terms. Or not, as the case turned out. But to think for a moment that Chávez' order was vague and subject to interpretation by his chain of command is the most naïve statement I've come across to-date.
I once again must diagree
"We can't come to a definitive conclusion from the evidence available"
I believe we can. Plan Avila. The President has full knowledge of what this means. The Army has only one weapon for quelling an unruly population: Assault Rifles. Activating Plan Avila means killing civilians. There are no IFs, BUTs, or other worldly interpretations regarding this order.
And on the Tiburon channels he CLEARLY ordered the activation of Plan Avila.
Ergo- He ordered the Army to shoot and kill civilians.
Q.E.D.
Your attempts at appearing as a non-radical and enlightening opposition blogger are naive and irresponsible Quico, sometimes, you need to call it like it is. And this particular case is EXACTLY what it looks like.
Without Plan Avila, that day may well have happened completely different.
It's about working with the evidence you've got...
...if Plan Avila had been executed, the palace would've been surrounded by Army soldiers packing live ammo. But the GN was already out there. It's easy to construct a scenario where the army was stationed in the rear, behind the GN lines, as a final line of defense that could be called on if GN was unable to control the situation. I don't have any evidence to suggest that that was what they intended to do, but neither do you have any evidence that it wasn't!
As it stands, the combination of GN and the Bolivarian Circles WAS enough to keep protesters from the Palace - which means the army need not have come into action, even if Plan Avila had been activated.
IF the army had been deployed around the palace (which it wasn't) and IF the other security cordons had been breached (which they weren't), THEN a second order would have been needed to order the army to open fire on protesters. The situation, at least with regard to the army, never came up. So it's irresponsible to presume to know, a priori, what decision would have been made in a hypothetical circumstance that, at any rate, never occurred!
Now, let me go back and say again: the Plan Avila order was such a high-risk decision, so likely to lead to a bloodbath through design or miscalculation, that Rosendo and Vasquez Velasco were 100% right to refuse it. A good case can be made that the order itself was illegal. But to equate an order that could easily have yielded a massacre with an order to commit a massacre is to skip over four or five key logical steps on the basis of nothing more but the fact that you don't like the guy very much.
There are any number of plausible scenarios where Plan Avila might not lead to the army shooting on civilians. How probable it is that such a scenario would have come to pass is a matter for legitimate dispute (and fun speculation) - but as far as I'm aware, Rosendo and Vásquez Velasco were making a point about *risk*. They judged the *risk* of deliberate or accidental escalation unacceptable. But they don't have a crystal ball any more than you and I do.
My last post on this subject.
Stubborn as a Mule. I know you perceive me as just another rabid opposition foaming at the mouth kind of guy. But really no other interpretation can fit the facts at hand. This is a man who did not hesitate to spill blood on his coup attempt in 1992.
"But the GN was already out there. It's easy to construct a scenario where the army was stationed in the rear, behind the GN lines, as a final line of defense that could be called on if GN was unable to control the situation. I don't have any evidence to suggest that that was what they intended to do, but neither do you have any evidence that it wasn't!"
Of course it wasn't. The evidence on hand supports this assertion. To begin with the GN was never seriously used to prevent the opposition from reaching Chavez's gun armed followers. The deployment of the GN and their behavior during the march betrays a calculated and pre-meditated plan to channel the March TOWARDS the Bolivarian Circles that THEY armed with GUNS and to top it off (according to both Pro-Chavez and Anti-Chavez sources) the GN did nothing to stop the violence and prevented people from leaving the cross fire. This is all gleaned from the first hand accounts of witnesses and evidence available. How on Earth can you possibly interpret this deployment as anything but confrontational, with the intent of driving back the opposition march with violence is beyond me.
If the President wanted to avoid bloodshed it was easy enough to disarm his followers (or never arm them in the first place), and keep the entire palace off limits to everyone and have the GN surround it. Please do not call this supposition or speculation. This is how prosecutors establish intent and motivation. It's crystal clear BECAUSE the President had other safer alternatives and he chose NOT to use them. You can safely cross off these other scenarios because they are contrived and do not fit the facts and evidence available. Interviews with Uson, Rosendo and Velasco establish that Chavez thought of using his BC as shock troops to defend his palace form the very beginning. This is intent, right there and then to use violence against his opponents.
"But to equate an order that could easily have yielded a massacre with an order to commit a massacre is to skip over four or five key logical steps on the basis of nothing more but the fact that you don't like the guy very much"
No, it is based on the fact that in Plan Avila it is clear that all unrest must be stopped by any means necessary using whatever force is required. That means rifles, that means bullets. When you sign an order like that, you are signing a blank check to each soldier to fire at will so long as he sees it as instrumental to establish order. It is equivalent to issuing shoot to kill orders. The Army has no rioting gear or crowd control training. All they know is how to arm and shoot their weapons. The President even used the activation of Plan Avila as another reason for his coup in 1992, calling that activation a massacre of civilians. If even CHAVEZ considered the activation of Plan Avila, the equivalent of mass murder, then whatever is good for the goose is good for the gander. Your problem is that you are stuck up in what-if's and might-have-beens because the Army never actually went out. But that's completely missing the point, this isn't about what might have transpired if the Army had been deployed. This is about motivation and intent. THAT much is perfectly clear, and I have no idea how to make it clearer for you because to me, anyone with "4 dedos de frente" can clearly see a connection between stopping your opponents at all costs using violence and the activation of Plan Avila. Any jury in a court of law would quickly convict the man of issuing an order that would have resulted in the deaths of many Venezuelans (Both Pro and Anti Chavez, never forget that innocent believers were caught in the cross fire between the armed Chavistas and the PM). There is no difference between issuing a direct order to kill people and issuing an order that results in deaths of people. You fail to make this connection. In court, ignorance of the law or of the consequences of your actions cannot be used as a defense.
"There are any number of plausible scenarios where Plan Avila might not lead to the army shooting on civilians."
And you accuse ME of speculation? At the very least I have history backing me up. The last time Plan Avila was activated previous to 2002 it resulted in a blood bath.
Rosendo, Vasquez Velasco AND RINCON
Don't forget that Chavez also asked Lucas Rincon to implement Plan Avila and he also refused. Well, at first he stalled, then finally he told Chavez "it wasn't convenient." Chavez retold his conversation with Rincon during the video of him in custudy at the Turiamo base on April 13th, 2002.
So to put it bluntly, none of the generals wanted to touch Plan Avila.
--Brian Nelson
Chavez planned an ambush on the opposition
1.- For days he provoked the opposition
2.- He planned in advance how to use the Bolivarian circles in CONJUNCTION with the GN to stop the opposition march.
3.- He called the bolivarian circles, armed some of them with hand guns, roused them and instigated them to defend the palace at all costs.
4.- Had hospital tents setup in advance for that day.
5.- Placed the GN in a way to funnel the unarmed opposition march so that it would clash against the bolivarian circles in the most advantegous place for them, av. Baralt.
6.- The GN let the violence unfold right in front of them for 4 hours without intervening.
7.- Aired a cadena to cover up with a media blackout the events.
It's the perfect recipe for bloodshed. I don't think there is any space for doubt here.
This is not the case of a scared president trying to irresponsibly protect himself from a perceived threat using the bolivarian circles. What gives it away is the placement of the GN and their inaction. It is not by accident that they were placed that way, someone conceived and ordered that specific layout. Who could it be?
No, no, no. There is only one conclusion. This is an ambush perpetrated by Chávez.
I{m sorry Quico but
You're WAY off the mark here. It's perfectly clear Chavez intended to have his followers hurt his opponents by whatever means necessary. Ever since Chavez has radicalized violence has been condoned by him. As the poster above indicates, the NATIONAL GUARD was present and did nothing to stop the violence and even prevented people from leaving the cross fire, and who is in control of the National Guard? CHAVEZ.
And your opinion of what the Army may or may not have done is simply wishful thinking. Rosendo and Velasco were professional men who knew EXACTLY what plan Avila was and witnessed its first application in 1989 when CAP ordered the army to quell the looting. It's PERFECTLY CLEAR what Chavez intended when he ordered the army to activate the plan.
You've said this yourself: CHAVEZ dehumanizes his opponents to justify the violence he applies against them.
Q.E.D!
Specific charge demands specific evidence
Sorry, FC, but if you're going to make a specific charge - "Chávez ordered his supporters to fire on the march" - you need specific evidence to back it up. When did he give that order? Through what medium? To whom? In which circumstances. If you can't answer those questions, you're just packaging off a supposition as a fact.
I don't disagree that your supposition is plausible. But it's not the only plausible explanation. It's easy to imagine a number of other circumstances where Bolivarian Circles members were freelancing the violence, or where mid-level chavista leaders passed on orders that were more aggressive than the ones Chávez had imparted, or any number of others.
On a topic as loaded as this one, we need to be extra careful. That's what I like about Brian Nelson's style. What he can report as fact he reports as fact, what he can't, he doesn't.
We don't have a recording of Tiburón 1 saying to his followers to fire on the other march. Treating that order as a fact is stretching the evidence further than it can go.
I don't buy your argument
Maybe it is circumstancial, but your insistence on a specific charge, of hearing an actual specific order feels to me like you're grasping at straws.
a lot of people have been convicted in a court of law by circumstantial evidence. And to me, plan Avila is clear evidence. Chavez KNOWS what Plan Avila does, as a former military man and as President of the Country he KNOWS what activating this plan means. We saw the consequences of it being applied in 1989, this is more than enough to charge Chavez with specifically issuing orders that HE KNEW would result in casualties for his enemies.
He also did NOTHING to stop the violence, that there is MORE clear evidence that he wanted to hurt his opponents. If his intention was merely to warn his enemies, the National Guard has the tools available to use non lethal force.
They also distributed WEAPONS to his followers, GUNS. You're not going to sit there and tell me, uhh Chavez may have been unaware of this, It could have a been a zelaous middleman. I don{t buy that either. Chavez controls the weapon supply as evidenced by interviews with Jose Luis Chirinos.
Keep Trying Quico. You may not have a direct smoking gun. But you have mountains of evidence that Chavez planned to apply violence to his opponents. Even the phrase: By whatever means necessary is hardly vague. You can't claim. As a president he is responsible for his actions and those under him as well as HOW he gives orders.
I'll put this forward: He NEVER gave clear and specific orders to NOT HURT his opponents.
Bolivarian Circles
Let me see if I get this straight. After chastising a contributor for supposition, Quico falls into the same trap by saying: "It's easy to imagine a number of other circumstances where Bolivarian Circles members were freelancing the violence, or where mid-level chavista leaders passed on orders that were more aggressive than the ones Chávez had imparted, or any number of others."
Yeah, sure. The BC was freelancing the violence. Mi fundillo. Didn't you listen to any Aló Presidente's before April 11th? In so many of those episodes, Chávez does more than just rattle his sabres against the opposition. His threats are clear; his provocations are violent. Who was his target audience when he threatened "escuálidos" or "oligarcas"?
Honestly, Quico, your fence-sitting matches your lack of logic. Or your need to construct a cover.
Kudos to Quico
"Quico, your fence-sitting matches your lack of logic. Or your need to construct a cover."
This an offensive and totally unfair remark. I don't always agree with Quico, but everybody knows that he is an unambiguous Chavez opponent who has done more to expose the nefarious effects of Chavismo than the vast majority of hard core anti-Chavistas. Part of Quico's effectiveness is the scrupulousness of his writing. Such scrupulousness has nothing with fence sitting or hedging, it has everything to do with intellectual honesty.
I agree with Koyla
That last remark is uncalled for. But I do maintain that in this instance he's trying to go for intellectual honesty to a fault. Chavez's track record and callous disregard for human life leaves me no doubt he intended to drive back his enemies at all costs and that included spilling their blood. After all, he didn't mind spilling blood back in 1992. He still celebrates it in fact.
Kolya, but my opinion stays
Quico has the tendency to 'sentarse en una nalga' on certain Chavez issues. As for intellectual honesty, I find that a galling description when the man didn't even vote, couldn't be bothered to get his paperwork in order. Hell, I don't mind the guy at all. But I won't be muzzled into the touchy-feely cocktail that sometimes resides on this board.
Wrong charge
I don't think the charge against Chavez can be: "Chávez ordered his supporters to fire on the march"
The correct charge would be: Chávez planned and gave the orders so that a bloody clash between armed supporters and unarmed opponents would take place. After that he covered and obstructed the investigations and protected the guilty parties.
I think there is enough evidence uncovered by Nelson to prove that charge.
Ah, the warm, soothing balm of compromise...
I'll sign up to that!
La emboscada de Chávez
Here's the post in Spanish
It's number 1 among the most read in ND:
http://www.noticierodigital.com/forum/viewtopic.php?t=640387
Sounds like the title for a movie or book...
que bueno que lo traduciste, Bruni
vale la pena. Y gracias. Gracias también al Sr. Nelson por no olvidar lo que muchos prefieren tapar.
Real Audiencia and International Court
Both of these legal entities kicked out accusations made by Himiob and others against Chavez, Bernal and others for the deaths on April 11th 2002. Lack of evidence was mentioned, I believe.
There are still loonies around who will say that Cabrices, Rivera, Peñalver and Atencio were responsible for many deaths and that Chavez ordered the shootings.
At least thee of the assassins are behind bars doing the 30 years they deserve.
Who Benefits, Who Pays?
Well, I would say that the most plausible senerio is that rightwing elements colluded with the US to manufacture the rationale for the coup.
Whose idea was it to march a contingent of rightwing opposition people to the presidential palace?
Can there be any doubt that elements of the US-aligned rightwing wouldn't have any qualms about murdering their own supporters to develop the rationale.
Sorry, but your gringo buddy's analysis here is pretty damned sketchy.
More, pimping the idea that Chavez ordered troops to fire on the marchers--well, keep on with that line of argumentation. See how far that gets you with the majority of Venezuelan people.
Not too damned smart. Not a way to win over a population that sees Venezuelan elites as sell-outs.
Five years of research...one guy ranting on a comments section..
Hmmmmmm...wonder whom I should believe...
Hmmmmmmmmmmmmmm......
Whatever you believe is up to you. But it's a fact. The Real Audiencia and the International Criminal Court threw out the accusations against Chavez and his "henchmen" for lack of evdience.
It's not whether you believe one chavista "ranting" in a comments section but whether you accept facts about what these tribunals did. I suppose that BN has more evidence that these tribunals. Believe it if you want but it just amounts to another campaign of "media noise" based on a foundation of sand.
It happens every year sine people on this bvlog and other cannot accept that the politicians they still support organiuzed the killings on April 11th 2002.
If politicians who kill are bad...
This is coming from a person who supports a politician who organized the killing of far more people back in 1992.
Hypocrite.
AIO
keeping the invisible boogy man alive
Keep keeping the boogy man alive.PLEASE!
Totally irrelevant.Even if the opposition shot first,which I don't think it did does not take away the overwhelming evidence of who Chavez is and his intentions.Just a time waster.The reality is now that ALL the weapons are in hands of Chavistas, and there are no prospects of any arms resistance by the opposition.
If people could have read Chavez's intentions from the start like so many of us did who were NEVER Chavistas, they would not have had to go through so much hassle. A good example of how easy it is for Chavez to control the situation in Venezuela.
Chavez does not need any proof but the rest of us do ??? Perfect example of injustice.
Some people like to keep alive Chavez's invisible enemy don't they?
Firepigette
Two Words
Truth Commission (a real one!)
This is what we will eventually need to find out what happened that day. I don't see it happening any time soon, but otherwise we will just keep dragging on with two competing versions of the truth.
And, most likely, that's what we will keep doing as a nation: Drag on with two competing versions of the truth until it's such a distant date that nobody cares too much anymore.
(Capablanca)
Sad
I for one think it is sad that we in America never hear anything about this and if we do, it is very little. I wonder what would happen if the biggest oil consuming country in the world began using our own resources. We are told to stay out of these countries but yet they want our money. Can we have it both ways?
casino online
I love this casino online and I think everyone else will to because of the casino cash offered upon sign-up.
Prosecutorial vs. political evidence
Quico and I already disagreed on this topic so I won't rehash my arguments. However, I think the main misunderstanding is that Quico is looking at this from the point of view of a criminal prosecutor. In other words, is the evidence damning enough for Chavez to be indicted in a court of law (a reasonable one)? That's where his skepticism lies.
However, the political reality is that, by ordering Plan Avila to be implemented, he knew very well what the likely consequences would be. So while his decision may not hold up in a court of law, it sure holds up in the court of public opinion.
Sort of reminds me of Nixon and Watergate - while Nixon was fighting a legal war, he had lost the political battle way before he resigned.
Quico sounds like the defense lawyer for the mafia
Quico sounds like the defense lawyer for a mafia Don who says," My client specifically told the hit man to 'take care of' the victim.There is no evidence that he actually ordered him to be shot."
These are the titles of Quico's rebuttals:
"I agree there is a lot of circumstantial evidence"
"It's about working with the evidence you've got."
"Specific charge demands specific evidence"
These are exactly the kinds of arguments that for years Quico used to claim that Chavez could NOT be considered a dictator BUT when he finally came around just recently it was a bit too late.
Firepigette