Caracas Chronicles

So the opposition has announced the 22 legislative circuits where they will select 30 candidates for September's National Assembly election via primaries. Good for them! It's a notable step forward that the Mesa de la Unidad has managed to work out its differences in a timely and orderly way, and that the opposition has set out an open and transparent process for selecting unity candidates where no consensus was possible. These are accomplishment not to be diminished.

On the other hand, the places they chose for the primaries are, um...a little mystifying: 

  I can well see why they'd want primaries in some safe opposition districts, where the primary will be the one chance people will really get to decide who represents them. And I can also see why they'd want to hold primaries in Toss Up circuits, where getting various people out campaigning early is arguably good for our chances in September.

But...a primary in Portuguesa State?!!? Only a political kamikaze would want an oppo nomination in Turén...where the government beat us by 37 points in 2007!

Color me baffled...

Whether any of it ultimately matters is a matter for debate, but given that the opposition is going to participate in September's elections to the National Assembly, it seems we should maybe have some idea of what we're getting into. So here's the nitty gritty:

The electoral system for the Asamblea Nacional is dual: some posts are elected circuit-by-circuit, others through state-wide party lists. In September, 110 deputies will be elected through the circuits (what "districts" or "constituencies" are called in Venezuela) while 52 deputies will be elected via those state-level lists. (A final three are elected by indigenous communities.)

The dynamics for the lists and the circuits are pretty different, so it makes sense to analyze each in turn. In this post, I'll address the lists. Later on I'll get to the more complicated - and far less predictable - circuits.

The Lists. Each of the twenty least populous states will elect two assembly-members  via statewide lists - a total of 40 seats. The three most populous states, plus the Distrito Capital, will elect three via list - a total of 12 seats. These list seats will be apportioned through the d'Hondt method. Somewhat counterintuitively, the opposition could well "win" most of the list-seats, even if it doesn't win a majority of the nationwide popular vote.

Here's why:

or:
An open letter to Julia Buxton...

Dear Julia,

I read your piece on OpenDemocracy.net and felt I should respond. I didn't agree with much of what you had to say, but I do think you're really on to something when you note that the major fault-line between chavistas and their critics is all about whether "democracy [can be] judged through reference to the procedural mechanics of liberal democracy."

I think that's an elegant, concise formulation. Too often, chavistas and their critics talk past one another simply because the first lot are talking about outcomes and the second lot are talking about procedures, and neither side seems quite wise to this dynamic. So kudos for calling that particular agricultural productivity enhancement implement a spade: there'd be a lot less muddle in this debate if everyone was as clear on this as you are.

Quico says: One thing is clear: RCTV's impending closure has been a public relations Waterloo for Chávez, an unmitigated disaster. The move has undone years of carefully spun ambiguity about his government's democratic credential. It finally puts some meat on the bones of our charge of authortarianism, it substantiates it in a way institutions like the ICHR and the Chilean Senate can't ignore and Chávez can't bullshit his way out of.

Quico says: Every few months, I take some time to update my "Greatest Hits" compilation - that Reader's Guide I've set up as the first link you see on the right hand column.

It's really meant as homework for the curious but clueless - people who stumble onto the blog for the first time, usually via Google.

This weekend, after adding that essay by Javier Corrales and Michael Penfold I spent some time updating it, cleaning up the formatting, and checking the links.

Quico says: Talk about making my blog superfluous. This article by Javier Corrales and Michael Penfold in the April issue of the Journal of Democracy condenses material that's taken me hundreds of posts to cover into a single, clear, stylish and theoretically-cohesive gem of an academic article.

I tried trolling it for a few "key paragraphs," but you can't really do that: the thing is too tightly written to pick apart without losing the overall sense. Definitely one for The Reader's Guide.

Quico says: Here's one that's been keeping me up at night: who's more dangerous to his country's freedom, Vladimir Putin or Hugo Chávez?

The question occurred to me as I read this genuinely bizarre story about Putin's latest move to control the Russian media: a twisted uno-por-uno scheme where radio stations will be forced to run one "positive" news item for each "negative" item they put on the air. And how do you know if an item is "positive"?

“When we talk of death, violence or poverty, for example, this is not positive,” said one editor at the station who did not want to be identified for fear of retribution. “If the stock market is up, that is positive. The weather can also be positive.”

There you have it, enforced good cheer!

Quico says: Today, it's part three of my exchange with Greg Wilpert, of Venezuelanalysis fame, about the April 2002 coup.

His original essay on the coup is here.
My open letter to him is here.
His reply is here.

Today, my reply to his reply...

---

Dear Greg,

An Open Letter to Greg Wilpert

Dear Greg,

I read your piece on the April Crisis with interest. While, obviously, I disagree with your overall interpretation, I'm really glad you wrote it. I found it really refreshing to read a serious effort from the chavista side to come to grips with the actual evidence that's out there. To this day, it amazes me that no similarly evidence-oriented account of the chavista version of events is available in Spanish. But, y'know, there are reasons for that.

Quico says: An old and dear friend writes in from Washington:

Hey, um, sorry your country's officially crossed the line into People's Republic territory...

AU finally managed to reschedule "Venezuela: An Inside Look" with Ambassador Alvarez. I did manage to ask a pointed question, which he wasted many perfectly good and innocent words in not answering. You will be pleased to know that although the AU School of International Service community tends to lean WAY left, the atmosphere was markedly - well, not hostile exactly, but verrry skeptical. I was a bit surprised. I think it was the Radio Caracas TV shutdown that did it.

Hey you! Hmmmmm...Álvarez, huh? I don't know whether to thank you for grilling him or nudge you towards psychiatric examination. You spent time in the same room as that man...WILLINGLY??!!? I've met dentist's drills more pleasant than Bernardo Álvarez.

I think, in your situation, I would've approached it differently. Maybe tried to organize a "Sulk in bed in your grottiest pajamas while Hugo's enablers gab" counterprotest. Every bit as useless, granted, but way more enjoyable.

Quico says: Pretty much everything you need to know about Chávez's economic model you can learn from this chart. It's an economic model of crushing simplicity:

1. Pump oil out of the ground
2. Export it
3. Import everything else

Of all of Chávez's empty bluster, the most obnoxious may be his claim to be pioneering a new model of economic emancipation for the third world. Very clearly, only countries sitting on top of 70+ billion barrels of crude need apply.

The unsustainability of it all is too plain to merit much comment. My fear, though, is that when a crisis does come, it will be used as a pretext to ratchet authoritarianism up a notch. A government never short of enemies has every reason to manufacture some scapegoats. It won't be pretty.

Quico says: Miguel points to this lovely Chávez quote...

"A President shouldn't listen to economists."

A fine sentiment, no doubt, as long as you can get away with it. If 100,000,000 dollars just happen to gush out of the ground beneath you every day, say. Yes, I agree, economists are pretty superfluous then.

I've been thinking more and more about the lack of intellectual seriousness in chavismo, about its active hostility to specialist knowledge in general, and economic knowledge in particular.

More and more I think econophobia is at the heart of chavismo, of its popular appeal, its arrogance, its basic anti-rationalism and also its tendency to authoritarianism. Chávez holds specialist knowledge in deep, deep contempt - and the more power he amasses, the more contemptuous he gets.

Quico says:

Rule by decree.

There's something irreducibly brutal about the phrase, something about it that makes the flavor of authoritarianism linger in your mouth.

Ruling by decree is what originally got Chávez in trouble back in 2001, when he first showed his disdain for pluralism by dictating 49 laws he'd discussed only with his pillow. That episode will likely seem mild, though, compared to the veritable orgy of rule by decree Venezuela is facing now that Chávez has asked the National Assembly to give him The Mother of All Enabling Laws.

An Enabling Laws is an authorization the National Assembly grants the president to legislate by decree for a fixed period of time. Time was when Enabling Laws could be used only as a last-resort, and only on financial matters. Under the old constitution, they allowed the president to move fast in situations where a long debate in congress risked deepening a financial crisis. Heading off a currency collapse, fighting a wave of bank failures, that sort of thing.

Quico says: After all the dread, after the slow, protracted, build-up of the last eight years, the denouement that began this week comes almost as a relief. Finally, after all the smoke and mirrors of the "transition period," the government finds itself with no reasons to hold back anymore. With power centralized absolutely, with no more institutional restraints in place, without even a looming election to impose a modicum of caution, we finally get to see chavismo the way Chávez wanted it all along: free to implement all of his utopian fantasies with utter, gleeful abandon.

Quico says: Thinking through JVR's exit from the vice-presidency (cuz, lets be real, that's the only part of the cabinet shake-up that matters) I was reminded of an annecdote I heard from a fellow journo in Caracas back in 2003. The guy had to go cover a press conference at the Vice-presidency, but of course those were the days of the daily mini-riot downtown, as government hoodlums took pock-shots at the then oppo-mayor of Caracas offices and Metropolitan cops tried to hold them back with water cannon and tear gas.

That afternoon, my friend emerges from the metro at Capitolio station to find the by then routine scene. He zigzags past the nervous looking cops and scurries through the Esquina Caliente crowd, wading through a cloud of tear gas on his way into the press conference at the Casa Amarilla.

Quico says: Well, the new year is here, and with it a classic Chavez mixed message. On the one hand, we can only celebrate the exit from high office of Vice-president José Vicente Rangel, possibly the only regime figure able to give Chavez himself a run for his money in the opposition loathing stakes. It's difficult to overstate the influence JVR has had in Venezuela in the last five years, and nearly as hard to overstate how insidious that influence has been. Essentially, his has been the only voice outside Havana Chavez has actually listened to since 2002. A man of deep cunning and flat-out pathological perversity, Rangel was the mastermind of Chavez's unique brand of Goldilocks authoritarianism: not-so-hot as to call forth unambiguous international repudiation, not-so-cold as to allow for any meaningful avenues of dissent.

JayDee says: The big day draws ever closer, though you would never know it walking around Caracas.

Sure, there are rallies and marches every day. Posters denouncing the devil and begging you to take off that red shirt hang from every lamp post. Well groomed talking heads lecture the viewers of Globovision on Caudillismo, while social workers in the Misiones warn that they will defend the revolution against the forces of the Empire by any means necessary.

But these atmospherics are so ingrained here, you tune them out.

Granted, in an environment like this, you can never rule out some sort of shocking surprise that truly mobilizes the populace, putting the scent of instability in the air.

But right now, with just 10 days to go, life goes on in Caracas much as it has all year. For a country with a reputation as a political "hot spot", the capital is, shockingly, a pretty boring place these days.

Katy says: Last weekend, my family and I rented a cabin high in the Andes to get away from it all. What the picture from the brochure didn't show was that the cabin had a satellite dish, so one of the channels on offer was Globovisión.

So much for getting away from it all. I hadn't watched Globo in ages, so I decided to take in their coverage of Saturday's 26x26 walk-a-thon.

The enthusiastic, racially diverse crowd was impressive. Globo's broadcast was not.

For starters, the march got non-stop, wall-to-wall coverage all afternoon. All they did was show the crowds all the time, which is great if you're a Rosales supporter like me. But what's a NiNi to think? That Globovisión is spoon-feeding them their chosen candidate. What a turn-off.

Seems I can't win: Chavistas regularly criticize me for calling the government an autocracy. Opposition people regularly bawl me out for refusing to call it a dictatorship. My choice of words may seem capricious, but actually a lot of thought has gone into it. Being a word-oriented kind of guy, I'm always annoyed at the careless way some of the "isms" are tossed around in debate. So I'll lay out a little taxonomy of what I see as the four key words on the liberal-totalitarian axis, to try to bring some precision to the discussion.

A Castro-loving, Bolivar-worshipping, onetime baseball-player wannabe, Venezuela 's Hugo Chávez is perhaps the world's most openly anti-American head of state. With Latin America in the midst of a leftward swing, how dangerous is he?

by Franklin Foer

Originally published in the May 2006 issue of The Atlantic.

.....

Just to prove you don't have to bow to chavista authoritarianism to hold left-wing views, here's this fun AP story picked up by The Guardian:

Hundreds of activists are holding an alternative symposium to this week's World Social Forum, accusing the main event of straying from its freethinking leftist roots and serving as a propaganda tool for Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez.

The seven-day Alternative Social Forum shares some of the anti-globalization themes dominating the World Social Forum, an annual event timed to coincide with the market-friendly World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland.

But the alternative event is taking up issues that are thorny in Venezuela, like the dangers of authoritarianism under a military strongman. The theme could easily be taken as criticism of Chavez, a former paratroop commander accused by political opponents of running roughshod over democratic institutions. It is off-limits in the main forum, said Nelson Mendez, a Venezuelan engineering professor helping organize the dissident event.

Regular readers know I've long resisted calling Chavez's government a dictatorship, and have criticized those who do. For all of the government's evident, growing authoritarianism, three basic elements of a dictatorship seemed to be missing:

Censorship

Systematic (rather than selective) repression of dissidents

Systematic (rather than selective) repression of opposition organizations

Huguito gets a front-page thrashing in the current issue of Foreign Policy. The piece by Argentine political scientist Javier Corrales is a good read, though I'm still trying to get my head around the idea of "competitive authoritarianism."

By Guido Rampoldi in La Repubblica
Translated by me

This article caught my eye for several reasons. For one thing, it's rare to see foreign journalists grasp how hollow Chavez's claim to be leading a revolution really is, and Rampoldi is unsparing on that point. For another, it's always significant when a left-wing paper turns on Chavez, and this piece appeared in La Repubblica, which is sort of like the Italian version of The Guardian.

With Primero Justicia's decision to pull out of Sunday's vote, four out of the six main Opposition parties are out of the race. MAS appears split, its leadership's ability to persuade anyone to vote is questionable. Only Un Nuevo Tiempo, the Zulia-state regional party and Governor Manuel Rosales' personal vehicle is still clearly in.

The political parties' leadership has been typically incoherent on this whole affair. First, they spent a year and a half convincing their supporters CNE had cheated and couldn't be trusted. Absurdly, they decided to take part in the parliamentary elections anyway. But since they'd already convinced their followers CNE would cheat, they unsurprisingly found it impossible to enthuse them about voting. In the end, they were forced to reverse their position at the last minute to avoid a humiliating defeat. You can call it "responding to the grassroots" if you want - but if the government exploits it shrewdly (which they will) the pervasive distrust in Jorge Rodriguez's CNE could demobilize the opposition for years to come.