“Go for short end bonds!” the salesman from a major Street bank told us, “that’s where all the value on the curve is!” My colleague and I couldn’t see the reasoning – just a couple of weeks earlier the markets had been in free-fall, with short-end bonds – the securities that are closest to their maturity date – hit especially hard.

“Because bonds that are due in late 2015, early 2016… these are the first-in-line debts; they will maturing in the near future, and what few information we have about Venezuela’s public finances tells us they are likely to be able to pay their debts in the foreseeable time. Beyond there, we have no f***ing clue”.

It’s uncanny how this reasoning has proven itself right this year.

Just like the people waiting in line to buy subsidized groceries in Bicentenario hypermarts, Venny debt holders are literally making a bee-line to collect interest and principal payments on the promises to pay issued by the Republic and PDVSA.  The only difference is investors don’t have to stand under the hot sun, or be marked with a sharpie on the forearm.

But just like bachaqueros, these guys are queuing up for a quick profit by buying bonds at the front of the line, ahead of potential big investors coming into the market. The bachaquero analogy, by the way, was coined by another salesman on a classic early-2015 trading day: short end bonds were up by 2 to 3 points with no supply to be found of at the end of the session.

Here’s a chart showing the % change in the “short end” Venny bonds since the slump in bond prices of December ’14. Note how what drives returns here is the maturity date of the bonds: the closer to their due date, the more they have climbed in price throughout the year.


(Source: Bloomberg Professional Service, Bloomberg MSG1 Dealer-contributed mid prices. The plotted period is 12/01/2014-10/02/)

*The PDVSA 17N or 17 New is an exception to the rule because of its particularities. This bond redeems a third of its value each Nov 2nd, starting on 2015; hence, its weighted average maturity is somewhere between PDVSA 2016 and PDVSA 2017 ‘olds’).

Fast-forward to September 2015: Barclays hits the Street with a fresh report, arguing that this line of thought is still valid and short-end bonds are going to outperform again. They add another argument: since 2010 the PDVSA Pension Fund, along with other government-linked entities, has been in ‘buyback’ mode: literally buying its own bonds back just prior to maturity, and especially targeting the very first in line. This boosts the market price of these securities while it lightens the debt service: they end up buying back debt at values less than 100% of face value, hence partly paying themselves and cobrándose el vuelto when these bonds are due. It makes perfect financial sense from the point of view of the government, and anecdotal evidence from the bond markets partly confirm this.

It’s hard to find conclusive evidence, though: public reports are outdated and lack detail on securities holdings. But in the world of finance, sometimes all it takes is a newspaper story claiming rumors of government buybacks, or a series of well-timed tweets from a FinMin official’s account, to create a self-fulfilling prophecy that boosts prices on short-end bonds.

But one question lingers: How much is the government sacrificing or failing to do, in terms of their future capacity to pay and economic potential, to show short-term willingness to pay through bond buybacks and nothing else? As worrisome as this might be for any Venezuelan, this is not a question that keeps Wall Street up at night.

What about 2016? That’s a whole different ball game: Nearly all research houses are predicting some sort of credit event next year, especially if oil prices stay at current levels. The Credit Default Swap market is pricing in a cumulative default probability of 67% between Q42015 and Q42016. The increasing differential in risk perception in ’15 and ’16 maturities (PDVSA 15 yields about 6%, versus 50% in Venny bonds due 2016 and 58% in the case of the Pdvsa 17 News) is a reflection on this consensus view. Trade accordingly!



  1. Beforehand, excuse my ignorance:
    Pdvsa buys back their own debt before maturity at less than face value? but how? Lets pretend im 11 years old:
    I have 100$ worth of short end bonds at due at the end of 2015. Pdvsa somehow buys it from me at less the face value? how does that happen? Why would I accept such a deal? As an investor Wouldn’t I take a hit, therefore wouldn’t yields go crazy high?

    • Well, there’s a market in bonds. They trade at less than face value all the time. In the case of Venny bonds they trade at much less than face value *all* the time.

      When you’re selling a bond at less than face value, you don’t know exactly who the counterparty is.

      You just sell it, and somebody buys it.

      DAUZ is saying that rumour has it that the government is exploiting this to buy back its own bonds on the sly, at much less than face value. Nothing illegal about that. Actually, seems like a good idea.

      • They are trying to duplicate Ecuador’s default.
        Scare everyone, then buy your own bonds for nickels.
        I think Venezuela’s debt is too far gone for success in thus action, but if they can get away with it, they can put off default for a couple years by attempting to roll over their debt by driving the price down, and buying it back.

      • Oh why Torito must you make opinions on a topic you *clearly* don’t know. Stating that the bonds have traded at less than face value all the time is not only a clear display of your ignorance on the actual securities and markets but also a statement which is not true. You don’t need to go that far back in time to see it (hint: 2014).

        You can call me pedantic, arrogant or whatever you wish but I have zero tolerance for such things coming from who ever it comes from (lo que haces con las manos lo destruyes con los pies).

        This is essentially the problem. 90% of the people (incl. economists, analysts, etc.) don’t really know about the market itself and write articles, opinions and make forecasts on things they don’t really understand. Academics and economists in their ivory tower…sigh

    • I’m not very economically wise but i guess these people are selling because they want to cut losses. They have already collected interests.

      I guess.

  2. Max, the bonds are essentially the right to be paid at face value at maturity.

    So let’s say that PDVSA issued a $100 face value bond due 2016. PDVSA sells the bond to an investor in the primary market who gives the company the $100.

    The investor then turns and trades the bond in the secondary market, selling it to other investors. Over time, the market “prices in” PDVSA’s problems and so that claim for $100 ends up being deeply discounted to take into consideration the risk of getting repaid at face value.

    Then PDVSA comes back and takes advantage of its distress, buying its face value claims (the right to the $100) at deep discounts. PDVSA saves money by “buying in the secondary” because if it waited for the bond’s maturity, it would have to pay the full $100.

  3. The regime by playing the role of the mad clueless financial government reduces the value of bonds which will be payable in the next few years so they can be bought cheap thru third parties thus reducing the burden of paying for them at their full nominal value . Of course they have to have the forex to make those purchases which is were doubts arise because revenues have fallen very low and the country is starved of imports it needs to simply keep going. !!

  4. […] And yet, Venny bonds are just loving it! VENZ and PDVSA debt is posting total returns of +4,5% on average month-to-date, three times the average for Emerging Market bonds for the same period. Some of the usual trends are showing again: Short-end bonds are topping the charts in yearly performance, and bond salesmen are dusting off their pitch about the Bachaqueros of Wall Street. […]

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