Sometimes, when good things happen, it’s better not to ask too many questions. This weekend, we woke up to news of Leopoldo’s transfer from a military prison into house arrest. Let’s try to move away from conspiracy theories and look at the events in the context of the facts.

LL refused to play ball in all the visits that he got from Jorge Rodríguez and José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero over three and a half long years in prison. There is no evidence of any quid-pro-quo from Leopoldo, VP or anyone within the opposition. All spokespeople for Voluntad Popular have been eager to underscore that point, calling on doubling down on the protest agenda and the call for the plebiscito next Sunday. (Full disclosure, both of us are Voluntad Popular members, though certainly not VP spokesmen.)

In this context, this seems more like a concession the government is making in a negotiation with Rodríguez Zapatero than in a negotiation with the opposition. We’d heard credible reports that Rodríguez Zapatero was threatening to pull out of the mediation effort altogether in recent days, and that would not have been good for the government.

The fact that the government was rushed to concede better conditions to “el Monstruo de Ramo Verde” to prevent Rodríguez Zapatero from bailing on them signals both divisions within chavismo and the dire need for the modicum of credibility that Rodríguez Zapatero provides.

All of that screams weakness.

So is LL’s house arrest a victory for the opposition? Definitely. The news was so surprising that, in the confusion that followed, the opposition fell into a senseless Twitter fight around Lilian’s statements, marring what should have been a big win with a senseless own-goal.

Chavista leaders would end up losing power and without the concessions that could come from negotiating the terms of their surrender.  

In any case, things get trickier from here on out, but the outlook for the opposition is also better than it was a week ago.

Rodríguez Zapatero has long tried to underscore the divisions between the “two oppositions” around the issue of dialogue with the government, working closely with the pro-dialogue wing in the opposition (UNT and AP, lately joined by AD.)

Spokesmen of the “moderate” wing of the opposition have already hailed Leopoldo’s release from Ramo Verde as a victory of JLRZ and Timoteo Zambrano’s “dialogue” efforts. This suggests that Rodríguez Zapatero will try to work with the “moderate” wing of the opposition to goad MUD into sitting down to talk with the government once again. Our fear has always been that such talks will only end up stabilizing the government in power through at least late 2018.

So how should we play this? Right now, the opposition is divided in two camps. There are those who argue that negotiating is the best path forward in a resolution to the conflict, while there are those that argue that, at least for now, we should just meet in the street. The different sides of this debate are dug into their trenches, and often end up mistaking tactical considerations for strategic ones.  

A better way to segment the conversation is around chavismo’s true intentions for the ANC, and the government’s capacity to actually pull it off successfully.

Privately, a good many MUD folk feel the ANC is a bluff that chavismo actually doesn’t want to go through with the ANC, and thought it up as a way of creating a bargaining chip to be used at a moment like this in order to buy more time. The ANC itself seems like a self defeating chip it has deepened the crisis in every possible way, alienating just about everyone in the country. At the very least, even Quico would admit that if the Constituyente is a bluff, it’s a bluff they’re spending considerable resources to make credible: there’s a huge propaganda and organizational push behind it now, and every day that passes raises the cost to Maduro of backtracking.

Letting Maduro finish his term is a small price to pay for avoiding Soviet-style dictatorship until el dosmilsiempre.

The alternative view is that Maduro et al. really are all in: using the crisis to pursue their lifelong dream of establishing Marxism-Leninism in Venezuela. The ANC isn’t about tinkering around the edges, it’s a plan to remake the State along Soviet lines. But Chavismo is a diverse group, and not all groups vouch for these extreme goals, especially within the armed forces. Whether the military would stay united behind Maduro after July 30th is genuinely uncertain.

For the opposition (and plausibly for the country), an immediate transition is better than a conditioned stabilization of Chavismo towards a presidential election in 2018, which itself is better than a successful ANC. But decision-making is suffused in uncertainty, and there’s a real chance of open conflict before it’s all said and done. The probabilities people assign to different scenarios are driven as much by instinct and people’s guesses as to Maduro’s true intentions as they are by real analysis.

Maybe moving consensually towards a 2018 presidential election is a way for all parties to hedge risks in such a volatile environment. But after so much sacrifice, should the opposition concede on stabilizing the situation, dialing down on protests and allowing Maduro to finish his term and have a chance at pulling something similar to the ANC in late 2018?

In the end, it all depends on your assumptions. It’s your assumptions that determine how much the opposition should be willing to compromise…

If you think the ANC is a bluff

The clock is ticking against Chavismo. If they do not recall the ANC, the military will do it for them, as the level of street conflict will be such that they will most likely decide to step in. In that event, chavista leaders would end up losing power and without the concessions that could come from negotiating the terms of their surrender.

If you believe this is the most likely scenario, then the only thing that the opposition should be willing to negotiate are the conditions of transitional justice so as to avoid further conflict and losses. The opposition should be able to extract as much as possible from chavismo. It should settle for nothing short of cancelling the Constituyente, restoring the National Assembly’s constitutional supermajority, renewing the leadership of the judicial, electoral and citizen’s branches of power. The start of a transition process that ends in general elections in the short term should also be within reach.

If you think the ANC has a purpose and high chances of success

This is the trickiest case. In this context, the clock is ticking against the opposition. The release of Lopez would indeed be seen as a signal of weakness, but only on the international front. A successful ANC means that chavismo still has a strong grasp on what is happening internally,  and that the military is firmly behind them. Chavismo might signal flexibility on the Constituyente, but only to try to tamp down on protests in the very short term.

In this scenario, the opposition needs desperately to reach out to dissident chavistas not signed up for a Marxist Leninist Constituyente. If you think the ANC threat is credible, simply making sure it doesn’t convene, and that some kind of democratic election can be secured eventually, is your biggest goal. In that case, letting Maduro finish his term is a small price to pay for avoiding Soviet-style dictatorship until el dosmilsiempre.

The other ticking bomb

The biggest open question in this whole calculus involves the armed forces. What would they do in the event of open conflict around the July 30th election? Do they have the capacity to rein in widespread protests throughout the country? And even if they could, would they? So far, the Army, Navy and Air Force branches of the FANB have remained passive spectators as the crisis unfolds. Whether they decide to intervene at some point, or whether they’re having backroom negotiations with chavismo and/or the opposition remains unknown.

One thing we do know: Maduro’s grotesque willingness to carve up power positions and dish them out to military officials looking for a quick buck does wonders for their willingness to tolerate repression as long as they’re not the ones expected to dole it out.

At what point does that change?

It will partly depend on how they calculate the opposition is likely to treat them if they get into power.

So what’s behind Leopoldo López’s release? A daring concession meant to entice the oppo back to the negotiating table and call off the Constituyente? A small tactical gambit to forestall negative international press? Just a head fake on the road to the dictatorship of the proletariat?

We’ll find out soon enough, but whatever it is, it’s definitely linked to the question:

Who is the clock ticking against?

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  1. Excellent article. I am in the “ANC is real and a threat” camp, and I believe acting on a basis that it is a bluff can be extremely dangerous for the opposition. We’ll have to wait and see how the plebiscite goes.

  2. I interpret from Rocio San Miguel’s interview in Prodavinci:

    that the Venezuelan military are Fuerzas Armadas Nacionales BOLIVARIANAS, which means they will protect the Chavista project. Furthermore they will probably depose Maduro with some illogical legal reasoning either through the Supreme Court or some ANC subterfuge. Then they will try their hand at running the country, because after all they are better than those feeble civilians.

  3. So sorry Moncho, I’m going to have to disagree on this one.

    “Los principios no se negocian” a lesson that apparently has not been learned yet. It is time to double down, have the balls to name a transition government by the only legitimate power left (AN) and work to make sure it is recognized internationally by China, Russians, US, etc..

    Let the military decide on whose side they are on and If they land on the opposite side, be ready to seek out international military assistance and govern out of some ship in the caribbean. Many in the regime’s cost of losing is infinite, there is no middle ground for them.

    I believe you are going to say “we are not there yet”. My question to you would be, when is “there”?. What are the conditions in which you believe a military conflict or at the very least the threat of a military conflict justified? I don’t need to remind you that the slaughter started and shots were fired by them many years ago.

  4. My view is that the ANC was first conceived as a bluff, but once it was clear that it only made the oppo more entrenched in their protest agenda, they said “Well f*ck it, let’s go ahead with it”. I don’t see Maduro cancelling the ANC without getting anything back. That was the whole point of the bluff: make a threat, and get something in return for withdrawing the threat. If he cancels it without getting anything back, he’s back in square one: the oppo in the streets, a divided chavismo, a no weapon to face them.

    That said, if Maduro cancels the ANC without it being part of negotiation with MUD, I would see that as a bad sign of things to come for MUD. It would likely mean the he got something in return for doing so. Just not from MUD, but from the FANB. The military might talked Maduro into dropping the ANC, and in return they could promise him to crush the protests and support his government, and allow him to go ahead with removing Ortega Diaz (and thus doing a favor to the military who fear justice).

    • The ANC is an order from cubans to guarantee the colony until dosmilsiempre and to guarantee the perpetual guisadera until dosmilsiempre too.

      Maduro won’t withdraw the ANC because he’s a cuban puppet and that’s the order that’s been given to him.

      The opposition didn’t double the protest agenda for nothing, it was precisely because Maduro and the rest of the high command decided that they didn’t need the opposition anymore and thus stopped offering and giving the privileges they handed, privileges that moved the opposition heads to completely dismantle and destroy the protests in 2014.

  5. The Constituent Assembly is a real threat which leads to permanent dictatorship unless stopped. If it is withdrawn, it is because the opposition forced them to back down on their desire to do away with all democratic institutions.

    As with Leopoldo Lopez, it’s important not to let the other guy spin our victories into sources of weakness.

  6. I think they’re serious with the ANC because they believe it’ll provide cover for two main objectives: trying to convince international observers that there’s still some kind of democracy in the country and give them the mechanism to install a cuban-style system which has been the goal from Day One. It’s now or never.

  7. The clock is ticking against Venezuelans.

    Maduro is not bluffing. Those that believe they could get an agreement from Maduro that he would abide by suffer from dementia.

    The release of LL is just a pirouette, a distraction.

    LL and everybody else will be irrelevant after they have the ANC in which case the military will support him and many, many people will die and LL and many others, if alive, will go to jail.

    The “hora cero” will last between July 17 through July 30. Unless the ANC is stopped Venezuela will fall into a dark and quiet abyss for at least 50 years.

  8. Juan, I agree, which is why turnout for this Sunday’s consulta is so important. Both sides, and especially the military, need to see what the Venezuelan people really think.

    • If turnout is huge, they will bin the constituyente. If it is chimbo, then they will go forward with it, bullshit or not.

      Nevertheless, it is best to prepare for the worst case scenario. I dont know many people here who treat this as a bluff. I hope it is, but I will not pretend it is- even if it is.

      What we should be focused on, and one thing only, is 16J. If turn out is huge, there is no way of stopping us. Right now, talk to every Venezuelan you know and have them show up Sunday to vote. Time for words is over, now is the time for action.

  9. Great piece, but somehow painful to read, how is that after all that has happened in the last three months, we end up with the same group of undependables calling the shots? Whatever happened to representativity, seriously, what is their success? What have they saved other than their butts? What kind of “glue” keeps Timoteo Zambrano seating on, an eventual, negotiating table? Don’t we care about the good image that negotiation process should have? Do we really care?( I don’t even remember the sound of the voice of that fellow).

    There is a segment of the opposition that is naïve, and sort of trust and might end up buying this sham, but there is another one, that I think is the majority, that is not going buy this again, and I’m one of them. Just to be clear, I believe in negotiation- but not with this people, and I mean the people on our end of the table- we should be the ones choosing them, and it feels like till now they have been picked by chavismo. That’s the perception out there.

    And regarding the ANC with or without it, we need Maduro to go and we need regime change. Political marketing won’t be very useful in the days to come, the change, whatever it will be, must be tangible.

  10. The time for negotiation is over. The crimes of all kind of Maduro and company do not admit any negotiation but stuff like “are you going for exile or shall why try you?”. That is independent of the actual plan with the ANC, or even of the actual current capabilities of the MUD to get to that point in negotiation.

    Because any sign of repeating the stupid dialog gambit will see either the support of the protest die and Venezuelans accept that given they dont have anybody willing to keep firm they may as well forget about risking life, or an explosion of chaos without any leadership that can calm it.

    At times, you dont have the luxury of being pragmatic. At times, the pragmatic decision is not to be pragmatic. To tell, clearly, that the situation is so awful that the time for horse trading is over.

  11. July 11 Wall Street Journal had an Op-Ed by Vanessa Neumann titled “The Venezuelan Regime Is Coming Apart”, in which she says that “A year ago the commanding general or admiral of all four branches of the Venezuelan military sent a letter to Luis Almagro, secretary-general of the Organization of American States… The generals promised to defend the nation against human-rights violations and subversion of the constitution — meaning they would abide by the will of the people, reflected in the National Assembly.
    The letter was made public only last Friday.” However, I cannot find that letter or any other reference to the same. Where can this letter be found, or did it never exist?

    • Wherever the letter is, it obviously isn’t worth the paper it’s printed on, as the military has done nothing while the Assembly has been institutionally neutered and its members physically attacked.

    • If Ms. Neumann saw the letter she would know whether the author was a general or an admiral. And what are the four branches; Army, Navy, Air Force, and, ????.

  12. The ANC is a real threat and the Chavistas have no reason not to go through with it. I am intrigued by the suggestion that the military may split with the Chavistas in the event the ANC is consummated. The reason given is that the military wont be willing to confront the opposition in the streets. From what I am reading that wont
    be necessary because the Chavista thugs will do it for them as long as Maduro is able to pay them and buy the inaction of the military. No I think Maduro will go full bore with the ANC and convince the international co.munity that it is simply a democratic choice made by Venezuelans. Mr Lopez’s partial release is a headfake to the end goal of the ANC, a socialist dictatorship.

  13. “For the opposition (and plausibly for the country), an immediate transition is better than a conditioned stabilization of Chavismo towards a presidential election in 2018, which itself is better than a successful ANC. But decision-making is suffused in uncertainty, and there’s a real chance of open conflict before it’s all said and done. The probabilities people assign to different scenarios are driven as much by instinct and people’s guesses as to Maduro’s true intentions as they are by real analysis.”

    This leaves out one crucial factor: The country is nearly broke and billions of bond payments are coming due in a few short months, then a shitload more next year. Maduro’s economic clusterfuck is so chaotic, corrupt and inept that no one seems to be willing to throw another dime at this “government.” Defaulting on loan payments will get the international community bearing down on Maduro like crazy. “Conditioned stabilization” assumes that ANY scenario could be stabilized with whatever money there is going to debt payments and the army of picaros still skimming with impunity. No one can stabilize a bankrupt system.

    Point is, the probabilities of forecasting the future in strictly political terms assumes there are resources enough for a society and the government in power to function in at least the most basic ways. It seems Venezuela is at the tipping point where politics of any color will soon get trumped by the desperation to physically survive.

    For Maduro, it’s a mater of political survival, though he has little currency (beyond daft socialist slogans) to negotiate in that regards. For the rest of the people, whose lifeline is drying up by the day, it’s a matter of outright suffering and depravity and loss of human dignity.

    For my money, the later is the real force at play here, and the one that will drive Maduro off the map as the little he has left is either squandered, stolen or is simply no longer there.

    Socialismo, as history has proved, in unsustainable over the long haul. That means any effort to stabilize a system doomed to failure is just postponing the inevitable. Everything Maduro has done for going on two years has been an effort at postponing. Agreeing to postpone, so to speak, is not something the opposition should even consider. He’ll fail – HAS failed – all on his own. Negotiating the terms of that failure is a fool’s pursuit in my opinion.

  14. I do believe that there is something that LL could do right now.

    LL could ask publicly that the Pope calls publicly that Maduro allows 16J to go forward.

    In spite that the CEV has supported 16J the Pope has not. His personal silence, and his tepid statements so far, has kept OAS out of the game.

    I am afraid that coming Sunday morning the people will not be allowed to vote!

  15. LL called Macri today, he could call the Pope and make the call public. Or better LL could send a telegram to the Pope and make it public.

  16. LL’s release more than an distraction is a ay to sabotage oppositions Equilibrium, what ever may it be, it was holding together with 100 + days of increasingly effective protests. Death toll withstanding, which is natural for war and conflict!, it has succeeded in sending a celar message to the military and the regime that they are not going to have it easy anymore.

    ANC is the end play here.
    The regime needs to continue chipping away at the nations democratic spirit, and it will deliver a major blow though more fraud electioneering and legalese facades.

    Having LL “thrown” into play at this moment, probably a win for Zapatero et al., serves the purpose of having the opposition and resistencia movements slow down to accommodate him back again.

    Lets not forget how convenient it was for some to have him out of play for 3 years.

    As per your thesis, What are may assumptions re. ANC? Well, I think the regime is pescando en rio revuelto. So far it has managed to control the military, and although Marina, Ejercito and Aviation are not openly repressing, they have also not yet split.

    The regime is not bluffing. It will carry out an incredible CNE irreversible victory. It will take the gambit to see if it can survive whatever reactions come after July 30.

    The plebiscite of July 16 has the power to defuse the ANC and bring the “momento del te” sooner.

    Once it is incontrovertible demonstrated again, that 805 plus of the population is against the regime. The military will have to Lavar o prestar la batea, for good.

    Its a time of definitions in the later half of July.
    We as citizens and commenters and influencers of public opinions need to open up the highest volume and channels to scream to all we have not yet been broken, we despise the imposed communist regime and we are here willing to make it very expensive for the regime to bring the ANC forward.

    That is all we should be concentrating in doing come Sunday.

    Yes, and getting our show tight with LL back again.

  17. Emilia, enough of the posts. If you have something to contribute, contribute. But dont waste the rest of our time with worthless posts.

  18. We all know the Chavista movement is actually made up of many contrasting groups and interests , we think that they all act in absolute harmony , but many have long suspected that there is no perfect alignment among them and that sometimes some of them will do things that intentionally or accidentally sabotage what others want to do ……or achieve , this makes for a very difficult game where no one controls the outcome of a decision. Maduro and his entourage know they will lose any election so they have to distract attention from the fact by creating situations which seek to alter the course of the game in a way that focuses peoples attention on something that makes them lose sight of the ball they are pursuing , one such manouver is the constituyente ………the constituyente can be potentially very dangerous for the big wigs because they dont really control what may happen there , this is a wild bunch , not obsequious little bureaucrats . they may take the course of things were the regime leaders dont want it to go……not necessarily favouring the oppo but some other concern or fantasy which goes against the regimes wishes….you may actually end up having a revolution within the revolution which shatters the regime to bits .

    Remember what happened with the armed colectivos and how they became an autonomous pararmiliary army which Rodriguez Torres tried to control only to get thrown of the wagon. the thing is that once you take these initiatives the manouvering room of the regime and the oppo to reach some kind of understanting become very narrow ….to back track the constituyente involves a loss of face of the regime leadership so severe that it cant be done and for the oppo leadership to even appear to negotiate anything that weakens full street confrontation is also well neigh impossible….

    So there is no logical way of assesing which way things might go ……..anything can happen and will happen ….the game is so ramshackle chaotic that whatever anyone does no one can predict what it will ultimately lead to ……….

    Somehow it seems that Luisa Ortegas actions have harmed the crediblity of the regime as much as many days of street protests …..but I figure her actions where prodded by the street protests and what the govt tried to do to quell them through the throwing of distractions like the TSJ attempt at taking over the AN fuctions or the constituyente….., could anyone have foreseen that??

    This is just one example of how we are on a out of control train that no engineer can bring back under control without getting tossed out of it…..

    • “Who is in charge of the clattering train?
      The axles creak and the couplings strain,
      and the pace is hot and the points are near,
      and sleep hath deadened the driver’s ear,
      and the signals flash through the night in vain,
      for death is in charge of the clattering train”

      from, ‘The Gathering Storm,” by Winston Churchill

    • Great post BB! Yes, we have to map out what are those cliques within Chavismo and watch them fall apart and/or drive wedges between them.

      This will be the most crucial thing to have happen: is that Chavismo will totally disolve and only the bitter-enders will be left.

      Many in Chavismo Critica have already jumped ship over the Constituyente and might even participate on 16J.

      Lets see who jumps ship next.

      I am praying for these guys to disintegrate from within and laughing all the way on their downfall.

  19. The key to the coming 2 weeks isn’t what the Oppo does (and, they should hold the line), but what Chavismo/Madurismo does. This week is almost over, and there has been no beheading of publicly-outspoken LOD, as expected/promised by TSJ, which means, so far, pragmatic Chavismo (and, their military backing) may have the upper hand, which, if it continues, and 16J is massive, could well abort the ANC. Pragmatic Chavismo/Military do not want to self-destruct, which will happen with the installation of the ANC, which will result in: non-recognition of the resulting illegitimate Rogue Regime by all major democratic governments of the world; virtually no democratic nation credit for needed Venezuelan food/essential goods imports; major U. S. sanctions on additional individual Ven. Govt. transgressors; probable U.S. sanctions on Ven. oil industry needed U.S. technical/equipment support; a Ven. civil war of greater or lesser magnitude; Ven. general population further much greater lack of food/medicines, resulting in the final wiping out of what little is left of popular Chavismo support; and, when blood is literally running in the streets, outside international armed intervention. The Oppo has nothing to gain, much to lose, by another phony “dialogue”, as the governing NM corrupt leaders will not give up their freedom/ill-gained riches, nor will Castro let Cuba fall into another Special Period due to lack of Ven. support, without a fight.

    • Great post!! Interesting that LOD is acting as confident as she is. Patricia Poleo is always commenting that she is acting like she has a knight up her sleave to protect her. That is, does LOD secretly have military backing and she is holding the Trump card at the end of the day??

      Maybe Oscar Perez is her protector lol

  20. Excellent summation brought by Juan Long. I would underscore the fact that if the “transition” happened yesterday, it would not have been too soon….

    Sometimes we cant see the forest through the trees. The People have the initiative. The regime is reacting. Keep the momentum. Damm the ANC, this is just a distraction.

    LL: Ditch that ToysRUs GPS and show up to VOTE ( you have to be in public, seen by all).

    Sunday is Venezuela’s D day. Think of a huge turnout in the 8 figures. The People wont be denied.

  21. “a good many MUD folk feel the ANC is a bluff”

    You have to be an idiot to believe that… I mean… have you seen the what this kangaroo court (TSJ) have done so far?

  22. Will Oscar Perez lead the revolution on Tuesday the 28th. The real Venezuelan D Day when Oscar goes full Rambito and the mother of all guarimbas goes for military bases. Haha

    Is Oscar Perez for real or is he a plant trying to draw the opposition into an armed confrontation?

    Oscar talks about taking out the colectivos. Big question. But is CICPC up for the job? Is he talking shit? Could this be a psyop meant to scare the colectivos not to attack on 16J? I hope he is genuine. I hope is is really on our side.

    He also talks about how Miraflores no es nada. Es una simbulo. Power is really in Fuerte Tiuna and that is where we have to go and look for them. Make them pay for their crimes.

    Dont know what to make of this. I would like to be on safe side and call him an infiltrator. But on the other hand he is calling out what is really wrong in this country and that is the mafioso generals who really rule Venezuela.

    Is Oscar Perez legit?

  23. “In addition to the six FARC-EP members killed in the past three months, nine family members have also been murdered this year”

    Above copied from an article regarding released FARC members under the “peace” deal.

    Initially I was inclined to think that with the state of the Venezuelan economy change would come soon. But sometimes greed gets in the way and you overstay your welcome. I now think that Maduro and his accomplices will go the full distance. They have a lot to lose, their families too it would appear.

  24. If Maduto does cancel the ANC, it’s going to be hoot watching fanatical chavistas explain why it was a good idea to do so.

  25. This is the moment for 350.

    It would be great if Leopoldo Lopez does the same thing and defy Maduro by climbing on his roof and calling all Venezuelans to vote on Sunday, the video clip will go viral.

    Also for Antonio Ledezma and all others in house arrest.

    And also for Luisa Ortega to call for chavistas to go out and vote on Sunday.

  26. We are arriving at the “Schrodinger’s Cat” moment, in which the Venezuela of post 30J is neither free nor not free, democracy is neither alive nor dead, and the grand exodus of millions of refugees to escape from tyranny has neither started nor not started. We are living in a state of quantum indeterminacy. The suspense is killing me…

  27. Rodrigo,
    I respect a lot your judgement. Still, I think I do not understand how you see the military the way you see it now.
    Please, take a look at this article on the Cuban military:
    In order to understand why our milicos are acting as they are you have to see on one side how corrupted the top echelons are and then how brainwashed the rest is. This is not the corrupt military with some bright spots we had when we were children.
    These are full thugs and kids as brainwashed as few outside North Korea.


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