Caracas Chronicles

Above all, this is about July 28

You can’t see May 25 as a normal contest for seats at the National Assembly and state governorships. This election is about surviving the fraud: Maduro & Co. need to turn the page and create legitimacy out of thin air. Since the July 28th elections, the ruling party has been trying hard to change the conversation and these legislative and regional elections have provided a great opportunity for it. It’s true, the word “elections” is a dead ringer for the one Maduro just stole, but this new event couldn’t come soon enough. He was able to create tensions between the opposition coalition by requalifying key opposing figures to run, which could eventually allow him to show a more diverse government. If he wanted to. Per the aftermath of the stolen elections, and the brutal crackdown against the winning side, that strong voice of dissent has become a bit more distant. It’s a good opportunity for other opposition factions to grab some particles of power or at least political visibility, even if this means to play strictly under Maduro’s rules, as is the case. 

Retrieving to the comfort zone

That this is formally an election, and invokes the performances and practices of an election, offers a service for a political class that has remained restless and confused after the massive theft of July 28 and the persecution that followed. May 25 gives something to do to chavista grassroots and the opposition actors that are not in exile or jail (at the time of writing). This event is, understandably, for citizens too. Both voters and politicians know what to do about regional elections. No matter how suspicious these elections are, they are comprehensible in terms of Venezuela’s lexicon and political culture. It’s an opportunity to do something politicians understand and know: canvassing, regrouping grassroots, restarting a career, hiring a community manager, going to vote. Resisting a massive fraud, instead, is another thing: no one knows what to do about it. This is why Maria Corina Machado’s options have been narrowing down to seducing Trump, trying to ignore the fact that Trump is not interested in regime change in Venezuela or in democracy in particular—in Venezuela or anywhere else. 

A reorganization of power

However, more than an election, in practice this is a sort of cabinet shuffle, in the sense that it means the presidency distributes power and responsibilities from above, across an array of allies and subordinates. For Maduro, every state has its own calculus in strategic terms. Having Rafael Lacava in densely-populated Carabobo means controlling everything in a central state with a big port, Puerto Cabello, so “Dracula”—who is otherwise unchallenged—will reach a decade ruling over his tropical Transilvania. For similar reasons, having Freddy Bernal reelected in Tachira serves the purpose of granting a power parcel for a relevant representative of the chavista old guard, and keeping him—whose ties with colectivos are very well known—as the guardian of a critical border region. 

If any opposition or faux-opposition figure “wins” a state (or a seat at the legislature), it’s because Maduro needs him or her there, as it might be the case of Morel Rodriguez, a living relic with ten terms in his belt as governor of Nueva Esparta. So, beyond the screen of campaigns and announcements of results, this event will turn out to be similar to how states were ruled before 1988: governors handpicked by the president. Because, remember, regardless of whether you got the votes or not, if you get a seat in this election, it is because the regime needs you there. In other words, you would be getting a position at Maduro & Co. Whether you can do some good from that position is another conversation entirely.   

Conveniently palatable from afar

Europe can react positively to the presence of non-chavista governors and lawmakers after May 25. Beyond the fact that Repsol, ENI and Maurel & Prom have interests in Venezuela, the E.U. has always been prone to finding a solution that doesn’t involve confrontation that involves some sort of integration of the opposition into the power structures. In reality this is not it, but it will likely be perceived like a better than nothing scenario. 

Also, it could be seen with kind eyes by the Trump administration. It’s quite clear that there are different interests wrestling over the Venezuela strategy in the U.S., tensions are really high regarding the future of the Chevron license, but something tells us that the end game is not the redemocratization of Venezuela. “America First” is responding to internal incentives which spam from electoral promises to internal disputes in Congress to geopolitical strategy to economic interests. When you take a step back and look at the whole activity of the Trump administration toward Venezuela, you may be able to see that there’s a strong gravitational pull toward finding some sort of cohabitation with Maduro—at least until Trump can show a significant result regarding immigration and probably bringing some other boys home. Seeing some opposition folks in governorships and the National Assembly can help the narrative of those pulling for the cohabitation/normalization agenda.

An inward show of force for chavismo

If the election actually takes place, even with little turnout (we won’t know the real figure) and Machado et al boycotting it, Maduro will succeed at demonstrating that he holds the reins of the institutions after forcing the entire State to steal a presidential election. His message will be: I can steal July 28, inaugurate a new period, and even force thousands of people to vote in a controlled election, and I am still here, sitting at the top of the pyramid. No matter what Machado could say on a voice note on your Instagram message feed, Maduro has not fallen. There is no sign of military fragmentation. The chavista alliance remains solid. Maduro’s only contestant to power seems to be Diosdado Cabello, someone who completely disagrees with having opposition individuals in power positions again. Cabello is ambitious and wants more, for sure, but he’s smart enough to know that his attempts to conquer power can’t put the chavista regime at risk. 

Whether any opposition figures receive any seats in these elections will be more telling of the Maduro/Cabello situation than of the regime/opposition struggle. If we see Henrique Capriles walking across the National Assembly’s main chamber in the near future, you’ll know that Diosdado Cabello caved.