Caracas Chronicles

This piece was originally published in Spanish

“Everyone knows. They know who enters and leaves the municipality, what people do. They control the area and have eyes everywhere. People live in fear.” That’s how a local farmer describes the ELN’s presence in Casigua El Cubo, the capital of Jesús María Semprún, in Zulia state.

Like in other municipalities that share a border with Colombia, inhabitants must live by unwritten rules, imposed by foreigners with other accents that took over the territory. The invaders belong to ELN or another Colombian guerrilla, the dissident factions of the demobilized Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), especially the so-called Segunda Marquetalia, led by longtime commanders who took refuge in Venezuela after the peace accords in Colombia.

“They live among us, they are part of this society all the time”, says the farmer, speaking on condition of anonymity to #LaHoraDeVenezuela.

Another villager claims that “we can’t trust anyone to talk about this.” Everyone is forced into silence about what the guerrillas do. In Casigua El Cubo, no one dares to mention the acronyms “ELN” or “FARC”—not in person, not over the phone, not even when they’re in Maracaibo, more than 300 kilometers away. People refer to the guerrilleros as “that group,” “them,” “the Colombian friends,” or simply “you know who.”

This situation mirrors what happens in other municipalities across Zulia, Táchira, Apure, and Amazonas—the four Venezuelan states bordering Colombia—where the ELN maintains a permanent presence. A 2024 report by Fundación Paz y Reconciliación (PARES) and Alianza Rebelde Investiga (ARI) indicates that the ELN is also active in Barinas, Bolívar, and Delta Amacuro. According to the report, the group is believed to have armed cells in roughly 10% of Venezuela’s more than 300 municipalities.

Casigua El Cubo, with 40,000 inhabitants, had to receive hundreds of displaced people because of a war between ELN and FARC dissidents in early 2025 in Colombia’s Catatumbo region. Guerrillas have been in the area for many years, although they reinforced their standing throughout the last decade.

The ELN uses Casigua El Cubo—bordering the Colombian municipality of Tibú, in the Catatumbo region—as one of its operational bases on Venezuelan soil. It is the most powerful irregular armed group in the area, with influence extending to three other municipalities in Zulia: Machiques de Perijá, Rosario de Perijá, and Catatumbo. According to the PARES/ARI report, the ELN determines who becomes mayor in these municipalities and actively recruits Venezuelan citizens.

Close surveillance

Casigua El Cubo lives by the laws of the ELN. If someone attacks a neighbor, steals, or disturbs public peace, it’s not the local authorities who intervene—it’s the guerrillas. Punishment is handed down by the elenos, according to two separate local sources, and it takes the form of “social labor”: those found guilty of minor offenses are forced to clean the town square or work like slaves at guerrilla camps.

Life in the town is quiet. Families mostly stay indoors. Only small gatherings are allowed, and only local authorities can organize larger public events. Businesses, schools, and churches operate as in any normal town, but fear underpins everything. People leave their homes only for specific errands, and no one is out after 8 pm, obeying an undeclared curfew.

One saleswoman who visits her family in Casigua El Cubo every two months says that, when in town, she remains behind closed doors. “My family tells me: ‘don’t talk to anyone, don’t ask, don’t go out.” She started a small business in Casigua El Cubo a year ago, to collect funds to treat her son’s illness. “The day I opened, they already knew why I was there. People I didn’t know asked in the streets how my son was. I would only answer that he was fine.”

Her family explained to her that those people were Venezuelans recruited by the ELN. “They have informants everywhere,” says the woman. “It could be the guy selling chicha, the hairdresser, the plantain vendor,”. She closed the store four months later and left town. “Down there, nothing ever happens, because no one dares to step out of line. And if something does, they take care of it. Everyone has to behave.”

The local priest had to flee after the ELN interrogated two church employees to find out whether they had been in contact with humanitarian workers or Colombian officials.

The first time she visited her family in Casigua El Cubo, in 2022, she realized a luxury SUV was following her to the nearest municipality. “They followed us from the town to a checkpoint just before Machiques,” she said. “They needed to know who we were.”

A Colombian social leader who took refuge in Venezuela after the peace accords, escaping from guerrillas who had threatened her, is worried about the possibility that they could find her in Semprún municipality. “I was born in [the Colombian state of] César. I fled the armed conflict with my two children, who were raised here. One of them decided to go back to Colombia and was killed there in November 2024, as a vengeance against me, because of the social work I did in my home country. Now, the Colombians living in Venezuela are afraid because the irregular groups are here, operating at ease.”

This woman knows people who, like her, set foot in Venezuela but had to sell their farms when other Colombians, the guerrilleros, arrived and imposed their rules. She’s now considering migrating to a third country, far from there. Humanitarian workers advised her to leave the country that once was a safe haven for her, which now means danger because of the ELN’s expansion. The local priest had to flee after the ELN interrogated two church employees to find out whether they had been in contact with humanitarian workers or Colombian officials.

Recruiting indigenous people, keeping police at bay

The elenos who roam the streets of Casigua El Cubo are low-ranking Venezuelan guerrilla members dressed in civilian clothes. They wear specific boots and travel around in black SUVs. Occasionally, they also display ELN insignias on their arms.

At least since 2020, locals say the ELN has acquired bakeries, mini markets, houses, and farms in Semprún and Machiques de Perijá. “They purchase them through a third party who appears as the formal owner,” explains a local farmer. The same source alleges that the ELN has recruited teenagers from the indigenous Barí community to harvest coca leaves or to fight FARC dissidents on the Colombian side of the border.

According to sources within ruling party PSUV in 2023, mayors are forced to meet with guerrilla commanders to align their agendas, and the ELN even selects some candidates.

According to another close source, the Barí elders try to limit the ELN’s influence on the community and expel anyone who collaborates with the guerrillas. “But for a hungry family, there are no other options for work,” this source explains. Many Yukpa and Barí women have lost all contact with their sons after they were recruited by the guerrillas. “I saw my son leave with them,” says an indigenous woman. “Since then, I’ve had little news from him. Sometimes he manages to help us a little, but working with those people isn’t a solution either. His life is now at risk because of the guerrilla war. Three weeks ago, we found out that three young Barí men were killed. We don’t want to lose our culture or see our girls marrying them, like what happened with the Yukpas.”

The guerrillas have sent representatives to indigenous assemblies, claiming they only want to provide security. They have disclosed the routes they use to keep the civilian population separate. Both the ELN and FARC dissidents control certain mountain roads that separate Venezuela from Colombia in that region. Sources say the ELN appears almost invisible on the Venezuelan side, but they intervened when officers of the Policía Nacional Bolivariana (PNB) attempted to extort local businesses at checkpoints in 2024. That year, in Rosario de Perijá, the ELN “acted against” an officer who was allegedly demanding bribes from truckers. Since then, reports of police extortion in the region have stopped. Villagers from El Cruce dared to protest against police abuse because they knew the ELN would support them.

Eleno politics

The municipality of Jesús María Semprún has had three mayors in four years. Keyrineth Fernández, who was reelected for the 2021–2025 term, was detained on drug trafficking charges in 2022. In mid-2023, her replacement died in a car accident.

According to sources within ruling party PSUV in 2023, mayors are forced to meet with guerrilla commanders to align their agendas, and the ELN even selects some candidates. A candidate seeking reelection told #LaHoraDeVenezuela that he had to request permission from the ELN to campaign in certain areas. Another source, speaking on condition of anonymity, explained that the specifics of the relationship between local authorities and guerrillas vary by location. While this relationship is unofficial, everyone is aware of it. “Many activities are funded by them. In every state institution, and even the church, there could be a volunteer working for them.”

All this power is justified by the guerrillas’ major business, another well-known secret: drug production and trafficking. In Casigua El Cubo, people have learned to live in silence. “We can only adapt to their rule: keep working, maintain order, and don’t interfere in matters that don’t concern us.”