The Pros and Cons of María Corina Leaving Venezuela

While we wait to see if Machado shows up in Oslo to receive her Nobel Prize, here’s a glimpse at the dilemma surrounding the trip

Since María Corina Machado hinted that she would pick up the Nobel peace prize herself, we’ve been drowned in a river of speculation. From folks saying that it meant that Venezuela would be free by then to others saying that it would be the final straw before admitting that the opposition failed once again in deposing Maduro. Some have said that she will pick up her prize and return, others say this is impossible. Here we want to discuss the implications of her leaving the country and reuniting with her team abroad. Our team is divided, between those who think that the upside of having her out and about may revitalize the movement, and those who think it would be a demoralizing factor for those in Venezuela. Let’s see.   

Cons

If Machado exits Venezuela, two precedents will come to haunt her, the cause and the Venezuelan people. Juan Guaidó went in hiding and turned to exile after the interim government failed to take power, even with such international support and with an attempt, on April 30, 2019, to ignite a military uprising by having the then-chief of SEBIN releasing Leopoldo Lopez from house arrest and committing a few soldiers and officers. Guaidó, who had traveled abroad and returned, was harassed and persecuted, and ended up moving to Florida after his own political capital had been wiped out.

Once Edmundo Gonzalez Urrutia left Venezuela, under pressure by Delcy “The Moderate” and her brother The Negotiator, the Maduro regime humiliated him and punished his family in Venezuela by kidnapping his son-in-law, who has just been sentenced to 30 years in prison on totally unsubstantiated terrorism charges. And a good deal of the Venezuelan population—as we can ascertain from social media, protest activity and off the record testimonies, in a nation deprived of free speech—assumed that the battle to win and defend the 2024 presidential election was lost. That was confirmed in January 2025, when Gonzalez Urrutia was unable to enter Venezuela, Machado was briefly kidnapped, and Maduro took oath for another illegal term. 

We must expect that Machado leaving the country at this moment will be read by many as another failure, maybe for good. She’ll be listed as the last one who tried and failed, like Guaidó and the others. The main leader of the opposition will be accused of abandoning Venezuelans to their fate: continuing living forever under the regime that devastated the nation. 

However, if Trump remains undecided, as he has been since the naval deployment began four months ago, Machado abroad would still have more options to keep insisting than if she were hiding or imprisoned in Venezuela.

If Maria Corina leaves, people like Henrique Capriles will say they are the only opposition leaders left, as if Juan Pablo Guanipa, Freddy Superlano and many others who were thrown in jail did not exist, and as if Capriles and his current allies would be anything else than pawns of the Maduro regime. 

Besides, the mere fact of going out is a huge risk for Maria Corina. Diosdado Cabello, who’s been saying that she already left and her story ended, must be searching for her. Catching Machado would be a trophy for his repressive apparatus and a personal safe conduct for him, the most valuable hostage of all, that he might try to exchange if he’s threatened, or simply use her as a human shield to inhibit any attack on him. The same applies for the Maduro regime: kidnapping Maria Corina on the way between her hiding place and an airfield will increase its leverage. These risks must explain that Machado hasn’t shown up in Norway at the time of writing.

All of this points to a negative outlook if the US does not take military action against the Maduro regime.

Pros

In the short term, if Maria Corina manages to leave Venezuela unharmed and reaches Oslo, she would have humiliated Cabello’s goons big time, even more than when her team broke out from the besieged Argentinean embassy. Machado would say that people in the police and the armed forces helped her to flee, and bask in global attention during and after the ceremony in Norway, where she would finally have the opportunity to meet her family, the international press and world leaders in person. She has been banned from traveling for a decade, and forced to hide for more than a year; such a trip will make her glow and display her ability to talk in public, and her good English, to reinvest in her personal image and the one of the Venezuelan cause. The liberal and non-Trumpian press has been rather hostile to her, especially because she dedicated the prize to Trump, welcomed Benjamin Netanyahu’s support and defended an armed intervention in Venezuela. Showing up in Oslo will see her score points in the global conversation. 

Once abroad, while a part of the Venezuelan population rules her out as the leader of the future, others will celebrate her courage, believing her promise that she will return soon and with freedom in her hands.  

Guaidó and the interim government were almost totally disbanded by exile; González Urrutia has been doing some trips and appearances in a rather protocolary activity since he moved to Spain. But Machado will be more effective in gathering support for her cause, with her team already active, a living network of old and new collaborators, and her own set of communication skills and personal attributes. She would gain an astronomically wider room for maneuver than the one she has had hiding in Venezuela since August 2024. Suddenly, meeting Trump and Rubio in the White House, addressing parliaments across the West, hosting rallies in public squares around the world, and engaging world leaders to pressure Maduro and support a transition will become possible.

If the US attacks the Maduro regime, one way or another, and the dictatorship begins to collapse, Machado will have better prospects to influence the transition and actually be a part of it just by being able to visit people and make public appearances. The theory that having Machado abroad improves the prospect of a military intervention actually makes sense because the US would not risk the person that would lead the transition.

And one important point here, which we can’t stress enough: She would have a chance to stand at the forefront of the strategy. Even if ultimately she’s not the one calling the shots, it is key that at least she appears to be in the room where the big decisions are made. Politically she will be able to show that she delivered. 

However, if Trump remains undecided, as he has been since the naval deployment began four months ago, Machado abroad would still have more options to keep insisting than if she were hiding or imprisoned in Venezuela. Even if we reach 2026 and the Maduro regime is still there.

These pros and cons come with high risks in every combination. Machado has been pondering the list since she knew a Nobel was waiting for her in Oslo. She would do what she finds it’s the best within her narrow possibilities. 

Leaving wouldn’t be an easy choice, but staying isn’t either. Something we might say about ourselves.