- While Guaidó stands behind the latest measures by the U.S. government, he’s working hard at closing gaps between the different G4 actors by pushing forward a modified version of the Oslo-Barbados proposal—which now includes more groups. Time is of the essence to form a unified front as the Maduro regime will move to sponsor a new negotiation proposal next week, and there’s a risk that AD and UNT will join in.
- The PDVSA internal committee led by Tareck El Aissami is invested in a plan to restart gasoline production in El Palito with help from abroad, but this is no short term solution. At the current rationing scheme, the gasoline reserves will be depleted in a couple of weeks.
- Sources inside Miraflores Palace report that the government’s intelligence services are quite busy lately as they monitor protests triggered by nationwide fuel shortages, problems in CLAP boxes distribution, and the U.S. Navy’s movements in the Caribbean. Also, military intelligence is tracking discontent within the Armed Forces and several defections caused by U.S. pressure.
These attempted defections, however, seem less relevant than the split the U.S. measures are helping to widen within the opposition. Guaidó’s more moderate allies are impatient, again, regarding the caretaker president’s welcoming attitude towards the U.S. Navy presumptive plans. This is why a new attempt for dialogue is in the works.
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