Esequibo and the Ghost of Falklands War

It’s impossible not to think about what happened when the Argentina military regime launched a war with the UK to evade domestic troubles. But the comparison with today’s Venezuela throws numerous differences

On December 3rd, a referendum was held in Venezuela on the Esequibo’s status, the disputed territory between this country and Guyana, and one of the  questions was whether to incorporate the territory as a state. It’s part of the effort to deviate the country’s attention from its economic struggles and the popularity of opposition leader Maria Corina Machado, but warmongering has been added to the equation. Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino López has pledged to respond to hydrocarbon exploration in disputed maritime space, and the Venezuelan military promised to build an airstrip on the border. Guyanese President Irfaan Ali has reaffirmed that “this Essequibo is ours”, his commitment to the defense of “every square inch of our country”, and raised the Guyanese flag in the disputed territory. Meanwhile, Brazil has mobilized troops to its northern border with both countries.

Almost four decades ago, Argentina’s military junta also hoped to distract from economic problems and human rights violations by reclaiming disputed territory. The Falklands War started by the military regime resulted in a disaster for Argentina and a transition towards democracy. Considering many differences with Venezuela in 2023, we think it is important to revisit Argentina’s invasion of the British overseas territory on April 2, 1982, and how Nicolás Maduro could carry out a similar invasion to address internal problems.

Patriotic frenzy and humiliating defeat

On March 19, Argentine scrap metal workers (mostly marines dressed in plainclothes) raised their national flag on South Georgia Island, another British overseas territory near the Falklands. The UK responded only by sending the HMS Endurance with a small group of marines. The junta launched a massive campaign of forced patriotism at home, believing that the UK would not defend its possessions in the South Atlantic, and a few weeks later carried out the invasion of the Falkland Islands, taking over the capital, Port Stanley, and the islands’ airport in a matter of hours. Contrary to expectations, the British sent a naval task force to retake the territory.

While the Argentines could send airplanes from their bases in the mainland, the British had naval superiority. The UK recaptured South Georgia Island on April 25, sank the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano on May 2 (causing half of the Argentine casualties during the war), and established a beachhead at San Carlos on May 21. The Argentines had time to entrench themselves, supported by the rugged and muddy terrain, but the discipline of the British soldiers granted them victory against the Argentine conscripts, even when outnumbered. The Argentines surrendered on June 14. 

Esequibo is not Malvinas

In a hypothetical armed conflict with Guyana, Venezuela would have more options for mobilization, although not easier ones. The Esequibo is thirteen times larger than the Falklands and has little infrastructure, making a land incursion quite difficult. Whereas the Argentines faced hills and mountains, Venezuelan troops would have to cross the jungle. Venezuela has already stopped vessels operating in disputed maritime zones in previous years, so an escalation can be anticipated. Venezuela has coast guard stations in Ciudad Guayana and Punta Barima, offering the possibility of an amphibious landing from the Orinoco river and delta. However, this means a possible confrontation with the United States precisely because of its participation in joint exercises with Guyana and an escalation of the situation.

Although there were limited covert actions during the Falklands War, conflicts are much more complex after the end of the Cold War. With the Venezuelan Armed Forces’ operational arrest diminished by years of mismanagement, the country could seek the help of irregular groups. ELN and FARC dissidents have already supported the Maduro government even in response to protests and are involved in the security of mining sites in the Bolívar state, very close to the Esequibo. 

Russia maintains close military ties with Venezuela and a presence in the country through advisors and technicians. Besides, Venezuela might not be the only one to count with the support of military contractors, like those who used to work with Wagner.

Two different international contexts

The Falklands War happened between two of the United States main allies: on one hand, Argentina, an anti-communist actor in the region and also a member of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, and the United Kingdom on the other, a fellow member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The United States opted to help the latter.

Arguably, the United States also has conflicting interests in the Esequibo. Months after the Russian invasion of Ukraine and with increased oil prices, the U.S. government granted Chevron a special license as an exception to sanctions against Venezuela, and further lifted sanctions temporarily in exchange for improved electoral conditions. However, ExxonMobil is also present in the disputed region, the United States has supported Guyana’s claim, and both countries currently conduct joint maritime patrols. The U.S. would likely favor the defender again instead of the attacker.

ExxonMobil is far from being the only company operating in the area though. The China National Offshore Oil Corporation also has activities in the zone, meaning that China has similar interests to the United States. China has traditionally been a close ally of Maduro, but its priorities continue to be economic and debt collection. Beijing can certainly exert significant diplomatic or economic pressure.

Despite being located in the continent, Guyana has closer political and cultural ties to the Caribbean than with the region. Even with incentives from Venezuela such as Petrocaribe, CARICOM has consistently supported Guyana in its territorial claim.

The big lesson: political backfiring

With the defeat in the war, protests against the dictatorship in Argentina galvanized, marking its end and opening the way to democratization. Today, the possibility of Argentina regaining the islands is more remote than ever. The British expanded its modest military garrison and built a permanent military base.

Venezuela could face similar consequences if it engages in hostilities: it could face isolation at a time when it seeks rapprochement and rebranding, as well as an ongoing litigation in the International Court of Justice (not to be confused with the International Criminal Court, also located in the Hague, which is currently investigating crimes against humanity in Venezuela). Current military internal tensions, which also existed in Argentina’s military junta, could worsen and lead to a power fracture inside Chavismo. Most importantly, it would defeat its whole purpose of claiming sovereignty over the Esequibo territory. If history has taught us anything, it is that wars take longer than expected and are unpredictable in many ways. Even in the unlikely scenario of a victory, the international community would never recognize any claims gained by force, just as the Russian invasion of Ukraine has shown.

The Falkland Islands and the Guayana Esequiba disputes might have many differences, but one thing is clear: a military conflict with Guyana would mean a defeat for all and would entail the loss of hundreds of lives, possibly thousands. There is still time to avoid it.