The Case for Increased U.S. Pressure on Venezuela
This is the first installment of #OptionsOnTheTable, a series of articles from different points of view to open the discussion on how to handle the post-electoral crisis in Venezuela
On July 28th, Venezuelans overwhelmingly turned out across their nation to vote Nicolas Maduro out. However, the National Electoral Committee (CNE) declared Maduro the winner. While the opposition has been able to prove, by collecting over 83 percent of the voting tallies, that Edmundo González Urrutia won over Maduro by 37 points, and the paramilitary and security forces responded to massive protests with a state of terror, the U.S. remains impotent as Maduro consolidates his control over the oil-rich nation.
The White House and the Department of State believed they had set the stage for a “free and fair” contest that day. The Barbados Agreement of October 2023 detailed extensive preparations for democratically overseen elections in exchange for significant relief from Trump-era sanctions on oil and gold trade. Such sanctions’ impact on the population was disputed, and most of them limited Maduro’s access to key state funds derived from the oil and mineral trade. The Biden’s measures that followed allowed the chavista regime to re-enter markets, generate revenue from oil, and strengthen their position ahead of the 2024 election. The value from the oil licenses granted by the Biden administration is estimated to be between $6 to $10 billion over a six-month period. An American company in particular was benefited with those licenses, Chevron, whose current production in Venezuela, of approximately 200,000 barrels per day, represented about 27 percent of national production in 2022, equating to 6 to 11 percent of that year’s GDP.
The chavista regime has a history of violating accords, as shown by the failed Oslo Negotiations (2019), Dominican Republic Dialogues (2017-2018), and Vatican-mediated Dialogues (2016). It took them three months to breach the agreement reached in Barbados: on January 26th, chavista-controlled Supreme Justice Tribunal disqualified María Corina Machado from holding office for 15 years, blocking her candidacy. Then, the U.S. reimposed some sanctions, revoking for instance the General License 43 on gold trade. However, the oil licenses remain active. And after the results of the July 28 election were released, an unnamed Biden administration official said, “it is not currently under consideration that we would retroactively alter licenses that have previously been given.”
Trump’s confrontational stance positioned Maduro as a pariah within the international authoritarian order. Biden banked on the regime adhering to international democratic standards.
The Barbados Agreement also included a controversial prisoner swap. The Biden administration released convicted drug dealer Alex Saab, a close Maduro operative, noting that “the United States government closed the case against Alex Saab when President Biden pardoned his crimes.” Saab was notorious for evading his May 2019 surrender date and orchestrating a bribery scheme in which the United States Department of Justice accused him of embezzling $350 million intended for affordable housing. Prior to the Alex Saab prisoner swap, the U.S. exchanged Maduro’s wife’s nephews, who were serving prison time after being captured in Haiti attempting to smuggle 800 kilograms of cocaine to the United States.
While the sanctions package implemented by Trump’s State Department failed to provoke a regime change in Venezuela but limited Maduro’s ability to expand his regime’s influence beyond international borders, the Biden approach, focused on offering incentives, meant in practice a significant reversal of the progress made in the previous administration.
Trump’s confrontational stance positioned Maduro as a pariah within the international authoritarian order. Biden banked on the regime adhering to international democratic standards.
This is why the Barbados agreements were perceived as a naive move by part of the international community.
In the light of what happened after July 28, the next question is what to do next.
How to Do Right by the Venezuelan People
The Biden administration should publicly announce their support for Edmundo González Urrutia as the President-elect of Venezuela. In 2019, over 40 countries recognized then-Speaker Juan Guaidó as interim president when Maduro started a period considered illegitimate; in 2024, only six countries have recognized González Urrutia as the President-elect, despite his receiving over 7.3 million votes on July 28th, even with millions of Venezuelans abroad unable to vote. Besides signaling to the international community that the U.S. supports the 67 percent of Venezuelans who voted to oust Maduro, that would match the reports by the United Nations electoral experts that criticized the lack of “transparency and integrity measures that are essential to holding credible elections,” while the Carter Center highlighted a “serious breach of electoral principles” and concluded that “Venezuela’s 2024 presidential election did not meet international standards of electoral integrity and cannot be considered democratic.” President Biden must also rally other democracies against the Venezuelan autocrat, which enjoys support from Iran, Russia, China, and Cuba.
The U.S. agencies should also re-enact all Trump-era sanctions to Venezuela, and close off the Maduro regime from attempting any international trade with Western allies. This sanctions package should also include measures to block the Maduro regime, as well as its allies, from accessing any funds they may hold in banks with branches in the United States or in foreign subsidiaries owned by U.S. entities, in accordance with the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s sanction policies.
President Biden could consider expanding formal criminal charges against many known allies of the Maduro regime residing or visiting NATO and G7 countries, requesting their extradition to the U.S. to face criminal justice. This strategy could also be used as leverage to weaken Maduro’s hold on power.
Following this, the U.S. should provide support to Venezuelan immigrants in the country, especially those unable to return. This could include renewing the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) program for Venezuelans and extending tourist visa travel periods until it is safe to return. Several recent polls revealed that millions of Venezuelans would consider leaving the country if Maduro remains in power. It is essential for the Biden administration not only to establish additional measures to accommodate Venezuelans willing and able to work, but also to use this as an incentive to assist in addressing Venezuela’s internal challenges, thereby helping to prevent a further escalation of the migration crisis in the U.S.
Maduro wants the situation to stall and might use regional stakeholders for this purpose. On August 15th, President Lula announced his support for either repeating the elections in Venezuela or establishing a transitional government composed of both opposition and regime members. Shortly after, Presidents Petro and Biden expressed their agreement with the option of holding new elections. María Corina Machado quickly stated, “There were people who risked their lives to prove the fraud. People who were murdered. To ignore that is disrespectful. Popular sovereignty must be respected.” Three hours after Biden’s statement about the repeating the elections, the White House retracted Biden’s statement and clarified that he did not understand the question correctly. In this regional context, Washington needs allies in the neighborhood. Argentina’s president Javier Milei condemned Maduro’s regime for electoral fraud, using rhetoric that mirrors the antagonistic tone of Trump’s speeches; other Latin American governments share that stance.
President Biden could consider expanding formal criminal charges against many known allies of the Maduro regime residing or visiting NATO and G7 countries, requesting their extradition to the U.S. to face criminal justice. This strategy could also be used as leverage to weaken Maduro’s hold on power.
Additionally, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) could consider significantly increasing the rewards for Maduro and Diosdado Cabello (among other chavista officials), currently set at $15 million and $10 million, respectively. The DEA rewards could be particularly effective in incentivizing high-ranking military officials to become informants or to turn against the regime, ultimately leading to the capture and arrest of Maduro and his allies.
Finally, the Biden administration should consider implementing a “Maximum Pressure Campaign” until the Maduro regime steps down and enables a peaceful transition of power in Venezuela. This campaign could include several measures such as designating Maduro-aligned entities and individuals both within Venezuela and globally as criminal organizations, fining financial institutions linked to the regime, denying flags to tankers involved in trade with the Venezuelan state, sharing intelligence about the regime’s involvement in criminal activities, terrorism and crimes against humanity. The U.S. could encourage American companies to withdraw from the Venezuelan market, similar to the earlier removal of U.S. civilians in 2019.
Venezuela is at a pivotal juncture not seen in the last 25 years of authoritarian socialism. The United States has the opportunity to stand beside the Venezuelan people in a democratic transition of power. Along with the democratic international community, it must take necessary steps to ensure that Maduro’s illegal third term does not receive the legitimacy it needs to succeed.
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