Caracas Chronicles

Recent actions from the United States against Venezuela mark a sharp escalation in a long-simmering conflict. On September 5, 2025, President Donald Trump threatened to shoot down Venezuelan jets overflying U.S. naval vessels and ordered ten F-35 stealth fighters to Puerto Rico to support ongoing operations. These moves followed a September 2 strike on a suspected Venezuelan narco-vessel, and reportedly, a September 4 Venezuelan F-16 flyover over the USS Jason Dunham.

Trump has insisted the purpose is not regime change, framing the actions as part of a campaign against narco-terrorists. Reporting from Reuters and The Guardian suggests the administration’s objectives are threefold: disrupting the Cartel de los Soles, signaling U.S. dominance in the hemisphere to Russia and China, and addressing domestic concerns over narcotics and migration. 

Yet according to CNN—Trump is also weighing military strikes targeting cartels inside Venezuela itself, a step that would mark a dramatic escalation beyond maritime interdictions.

Among some in Venezuela’s opposition and a 7.8 million-strong diaspora, the actions are interpreted as signs of imminent regime collapse. That expectation is dangerously misplaced.

This assessment is best understood as a snapshot of a moving situation. Events are shifting not by the month or week, but almost by the hour. A single incident—a downed jet, a large seizure, or now, the potential for U.S. strikes on Venezuelan soil—could alter the trajectory dramatically.

Disrupting narco-networks

The central U.S. target is the Cartel de los Soles. Far from a single cartel run by Nicolás Maduro, it is a diffuse network of Venezuelan military and political elites who profit from cocaine transshipment. As InSight Crime documents, its origins stretch back to Hugo Chávez’s officers in the 1990s and later expanded under Maduro and Diosdado Cabello. It functions through bribes, access to infrastructure, and cooperation with groups like Colombia’s ELN and Mexico’s Sinaloa Cartel.

InSight Crime analysis also highlights how U.S. sanctions often exaggerate Maduro’s direct command, but the revenue is nonetheless vast—an estimated $5.1 billion annually, sustaining patronage networks and buying the loyalty of senior commanders.

The U.S. argues that designating Venezuelan traffickers as narco-terrorists places the action on the same legal footing as drone strikes against ISIS or the Houthis.

The United States has deployed seven warships and one nuclear-powered fast attack submarine, carrying more than 4,500 sailors and Marines, to the southern Caribbean as part of its anti-drug effort.

More than financial strain, the danger lies in relational stress. Venezuela’s narco-partners are notoriously paranoid and violent, quick to see betrayal in coincidence and to punish even imagined slights. In such an environment, added costs, delays, and risks can easily be interpreted as sabotage.

It is in these situations that conspiracies are born—whispers that Maduro or Cabello are no longer protecting the trade but endangering it. If that perception takes hold, the regime could suddenly be recast not as an ally, but as a liability.

Global signaling and domestic politics

Beyond drug flows, the escalations send a message to Russia and China. Moscow’s arms sales and Beijing’s oil investments have deepened their footprint in Venezuela. The U.S. show of force is designed to keep both powers “at bay,” at least temporarily, reminding them that the Western Hemisphere remains an American sphere of influence.

But Democratic legal challenges are certain. Critics argue that striking a Venezuelan vessel without clear proof of narco ties exceeds the president’s authority. The administration counters that designating Venezuelan traffickers as narco-terrorists places the action on the same legal footing as drone strikes against ISIS or the Houthis in Yemen. The precedent is controversial—Venezuela is a sovereign state, not an ungoverned terror zone—but the White House appears confident it can defend its position.

Administration officials also noted that they directed the vessel to stop and it was ignored on multiple occasions.

Pressure on Colombia and Ecuador

As U.S. interdictions mount, traffickers adapt. Colombia now dominates the global coca landscape—controlling over two-thirds of world production in 2023, while cocaine production and seizures reached historic highs, according to UNODC. The consequences reverberate through regional trafficking routes, especially via the Pacific, where pressures on Ecuador and elsewhere are rising.

The U.S. will likely continue interdictions, raising the cost of trafficking and testing the regime’s relationships with its criminal allies.

Colombia faces a political crunch: President Gustavo Petro champions a non-militarized drug policy, but Washington is pressing for harder interdictions ahead of its September 15 drug-certification review. Ecuador, meanwhile, risks further destabilization as rerouted flows amplify violence and corruption. In both cases, alliances with the U.S. are strained even as traffickers continue to adapt.

An opposition between illusions and threats

The Venezuelan opposition, led by María Corina Machado, has long read U.S. pressure as a precursor to regime collapse. After Edmundo González’s disputed 67% victory in the 2024 election, expectations of a democratic transition remain high. Yet this optimism is detached from reality.

As one observer put it, the opposition hopes to “seamlessly step into a train going 100 miles an hour” after decades without power. Having last governed in the 1990s, it lacks institutional control, governance capacity, and a coherent plan to manage Venezuela’s crises: 80% poverty, failing oil infrastructure, and a criminalized state.

Worse, the risks are not theoretical. Diosdado Cabello has openly warned that as U.S. pressure intensifies, so will regime repression. Machado and her supporters could soon face harassment, detention, or worse. Without a clear statement of support from Washington now, the opposition risks being decapitated before it can organize.

Some speculate that Maduro could be forced out as a concession, leaving Diosdado Cabello, Vladimir Padrino, or Jorge and Delcy Rodríguez to preserve the regime. Yet this ignores the reality of the “core four” pact: their survival is intertwined through shared crimes and mutual exposure. Sacrificing Maduro alone would not stabilize the system—it would fracture it, threaten his extended clan, and risk violent infighting that could unravel the regime from within.

The greatest danger, however, is not simply that Maduro proves resilient, but that he falls without a viable counterpart ready to govern.

That calculation may prove correct. Maduro is both the face of repression and the nexus of family networks that keep the system afloat. But the problem is what comes next: an opposition woefully unprepared to step into power, facing a fractured state, violent criminal groups, and the remnants of a military-narco alliance. The collapse could create not renewal, but a dangerous vacuum.

Likely outcomes in a fluid situation

The U.S. will likely continue interdictions, raising the cost of trafficking and testing the regime’s relationships with its criminal allies. This may not bankrupt Maduro, but it could destabilize the delicate balance of trust with traffickers. If those ties fray, the consequences could be more dangerous for the regime than sanctions or financial pressure ever were.

Russia and China will probably bide their time, weighing the permanence of U.S. deployments before committing further resources. The Venezuelan diaspora and opposition, meanwhile, risk disappointment as their hopes for U.S.-engineered regime change collide with a policy focused narrowly on drugs and migration.

The greatest danger, however, is not simply that Maduro proves resilient, but that he falls without a viable counterpart ready to govern. Washington’s pressure campaign may succeed in destabilizing the narco-state bargain that keeps the regime afloat. Yet if that collapse comes, the opposition will step into a void they are utterly unprepared to fill. The result would not be democratic renewal, but paralysis, economic freefall, and criminal networks rushing to occupy the vacuum.

In that scenario, the United States would bear direct responsibility. By accelerating regime collapse without preparing the opposition or planning for the aftermath, Washington risks triggering a disaster worse than the status quo. The regional impact—from refugee surges to cartel realignments—would be profound, and the U.S. is not ready to assume the cost or the long-term commitment required to manage it.