Caracas Chronicles

On one hand, the Milei government becomes increasingly dependent on Team Trump. On the other, Petro’s endless Twitter rants remind of the Cold War rhetoric of Hugo Chávez and his old mates in the Pink Tide. The ideological standoff between Latin American factions is intensifying, from the Left’s anti-imperialist lectures to the Right’s pursuit of Trump’s recognition. The region’s political divide looks more obvious as the U.S. approaches Venezuela. For many, this reawakes the old dream of Latin American integration, but also reminds of the pitfalls of previous efforts. It’s a moment that underscores both the enduring challenges of sustained regional unity and a window of opportunity for renewed cooperation.

The ideational roots of a Latin American (LATAM) union can be traced back to the 1819 Congress of Angostura, where Simón Bolívar convened representatives from Venezuela and Nueva Granada to establish the ephemeral project of Gran Colombia, then known as Colombia. Fast-forward 200 years, and the governments of Bukele, Milei, Noboa and Peña claim to be aligning their governments toward the idea of regional security—this time focusing on battling drug cartels.

Bolívar sought to balance power asymmetries between Latin American countries and the rising powers of the time, the United States and Great Britain. Conversely, today’s alignment rallies behind a U.S. campaign driven purely by America First incentives—revealing how the loose interests of Latin American foreign policy, instead of pursuing strategic regional autonomy, remains reactionary and dependent on the desires or inactions of Trump and his MAGA movement.

U.S. foreign policy has undergone drastic shifts since Trump took over in January, especially regarding trade, defense, and immigration. This offers opportunities for pragmatic leadership in Latin America to consolidate and improve existing mechanisms of regional integration, aiming to create a unified bloc that protects common interests in an increasingly fragmented world. Nonetheless, pragmatism is not a defining characteristic of our presidents, and the Venezuelan conflict has resurfaced the longstanding tensions that have hindered integration throughout many eras.

Europe becoming the global example of integration has exposed Latin America’s lack of maturity. In the meantime key trade deals like the EU-Mercosur agreement have taken ages to reach a breakthrough.

Contrary to the European project, which emerged from the success of gradual economic integration, LATAM integration has endured waves of stagnation and reversal defined by its shortcomings. Initial efforts such as Bolívar’s Gran Colombia and other confederation projects in the Andes and Central America quickly crumbled. Political unity fragmented, and countries reverted to a softer union limited to managing international relations, later described as Pan-Americanism. Over a century later, the LATAM integration project evolved into three distinct waves.

The old bloc sancocho

The first wave, between the 1950s and 1970s, was defined by a response to European protectionist measures against Latin American exports. As the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) took shape, organizations including CARICOM, LAFTA, CACM, and the Andean Pact emerged. These initiatives sought to increase regional autonomy through deeper economic and social cooperation, creating positive spillover effects to incentivize further integration.

However, weak commitments and limited delegation of authority (from states to supranational entities) stalled progress. Whereas the ECSC fostered interdependence and post-war industrial recovery in Europe, LATAM countries focused narrowly on trade liberalization and lacked the political will for balanced industrial development across the region. As Latin America stalled, the European project advanced into the European Economic Community.

The second wave in the 1980s–1990s resulted from democratization and pressures of globalization. Influenced by the “Washington Consensus,” this wave embraced neoliberal policies that imposed informal rules focused again on trade liberalization. NAFTA and Mercosur emerged, and first-wave organizations were relaunched. Mercosur in particular aspired to follow the ECSC’s model, but by centering solely on economic interdependence and excluding social cooperation or defense, its ambitions fell short.

Political volatility has made the organization stagnate throughout the century, from Venezuela’s suspension after the 2017 quiebre constitucional to Milei’s threats of withdrawal. States have been unwilling to delegate competencies and authority to meet the goals of Mercosur, leaving a shallow institutional framework. Europe becoming the global example of integration has exposed Latin America’s lack of maturity. In the meantime key trade deals like the EU-Mercosur agreement have taken ages to reach a breakthrough.

Our history of stagnation and reversal reveals three core obstacles to collective action: shallow institutions, weak delegation of authority, and ideological instrumentalization by regional powers.

The third wave of LATAM integration was characterised by its post-liberal nature, supposedly an attempt to circle back to Bolívar’s desire for political unity and a shared identity. Led by Hugo Chávez, it emerged with the rise of left-leaning governments that sought to decouple from neoliberalism, the OAS and the UN. New organizations emerged—CELAC, ALBA, and UNASUR—adding to an increasingly fragmented regional environment. Although CELAC retains some relevance, ALBA and UNASUR quickly rose and fell as ideological strongholds. Following previous trends, weak institutional foundations and limited delegation of power rendered governing bodies fundamentally powerless.

Ultimately, the sancocho of integration attempts has produced two negative effects: politically, states are constrained by dual loyalties to competing organizations. In economic terms, overlapping regulations exacerbate the “spaghetti bowl” effect, undermining cohesive action. LATAM’s history of stagnation and reversal reveals three core obstacles to collective action: shallow institutions, weak delegation of authority, and ideological instrumentalization by regional powers.  The extent of this recurring integration struggle now manifests in the turmoil driven by the U.S.-Venezuela conflict.

Trump sounds the alarm

U.S. actions over the past eight months indicate a sharp turn in its policy on Latin America: buying Argentine pesos, outsourcing its prisons to El Salvador, signing security cooperation treaties with Caribbean nations, and raising tariffs on non-aligned countries, notably Brazil. Most recently, with bolstered military presence in the Caribbean, the U.S. seems intent on reestablishing a strong sphere of influence in its old backyard. Right-leaning governments in the region are cooperating on security and may genuinely seek to free the region from toxic autocracies like Venezuela. But such convergence is purely driven by the incentives the U.S. provides.

Other global actors matter too. The shift in U.S. strategy responds largely to China’s growing presence. China has become an alternative lender, expanding its influence while flooding LATAM markets with competitive products in key sectors such as automotive and electronics. The U.S. now sees regaining regional hegemony as key to countering the Chinese challenge.

In a fashion similar to the second wave of integration, the U.S. seeks to impose itself going beyond neoliberal economics. Defense and security are seemingly key now. This raises a pressing question: To what extent is the push to resolve the Venezuelan crisis motivated by genuine regional intentions for democratic transition, versus a mere opportunity to strengthen future ties with Trump?

The unreliability that Trump represents signals a unique opportunity to create regional economic and security linkages.

Either way, the shift in U.S. policy creates an opening for building a unified front—not against the U.S., but beyond it. Just as Europe forged interdependence after the Marshall Plan, Latin America can use this geopolitical moment to create economic and security linkages that develop and shield the region. A holistic framework—including defense and political unity—can emerge by rallying around the Venezuelan cause.

The challenge is channeling these lessons into one stream of integration, not creating new organizations. Mercosur aimed to become a common market promoting free movement of goods, people, and capital, but political volatility and disagreements between its main players, Brazil and Argentina, have stalled its ambitions. Now, U.S. protectionism provides an opportunity to reactivate Mercosur’s agenda, and to broker new deals on an internal and intercontinental level. Mirroring the European protectionism that sparked our first wave, the unreliability that Trump represents signals a unique opportunity.

In a fragmented world where regional partnerships are increasingly strategic, Mercosur could leverage its members’ vast natural resources to broker agreements in areas such as artificial intelligence. For Mercosur to seize the moment, countries need to deepen institutional foundations by delegating real authority, allowing Mercosur to enforce rules and drive further integration. As benefits materialize, states will delegate more, strengthening the bloc and insulating it from political shocks.

A true pursuit of regional autonomy—shielded from ideological polarization—will remain unrealized if leaders cannot learn from past lessons and overcome the ideological divide. Venezuela still needs continued U.S. support to resolve its crisis. Looking ahead, a democratic transition in Venezuela could become the foundation for LATAM countries that have backed the cause to establish economic, security, and political interdependencies beyond the interests of an administration in Washington. Venezuela could become the catalyst—and later the spearhead—of a renewed integration process that develops regional economies, leverages natural resources, protects shared interests, and shields the region from authoritarianism.