Caracas Chronicles

We return to the crystal-ball conversation. Last time, we concluded that if the current opposition manages to form a government without chavismo, the Armed Forces (FANB) will remain a central player in political life. Even a high command without faces featured on American “Wanted” posters would seek to keep control of the broad portfolio of businesses and budgets it secured during chavismo, while still appealing—if only rhetorically—to Bolivarianism as a way to legitimize the defense of those material interests.

This leaves the opposition-turned-government in an uncomfortable position. On the one hand, it will owe the United States dearly, since Washington would be the real architect of Venezuela’s transition. But at the same time, FANB will continue to keep its hand on the emergency brake of that transition.

The military understands that Rome doesn’t pay traitors, and that if they open the door, the U.S. will want obedient officers. That’s why they won’t allow Venezuela’s ties with Russia and China to be broken or watered down, since those connections help any military faction avoid the fate of their predecessors.

The eventual ex-opposition, therefore, can neither lean too far in favor of the FANB—at the risk of facing U.S. economic and political sanctions—nor lean too far toward Washington, at the risk of being ousted by the FANB. But there is a third and final risk: that the U.S. and the FANB realize they don’t actually need María Corina Machado or the G4 in a new regime where both sides could benefit—because Venezuela would no longer be a hemispheric problem, U.S. oil and mining business could move forward, and Washington would allow FANB to continue the business ventures it inherited from chavismo.

This is why the opposition must begin, right now, to prove why it is indispensable both to the U.S. and to the FANB, in order to ensure that the transition leads to an effective democracy. That means the opposition has to start debating the very issues that could cause friction between the U.S. and the FANB.

Defense investment

Defense investment doesn’t just mean buying weapons. It also means purchasing spare parts, maintaining equipment, paying for licenses, software, and the technical expertise of suppliers. States can replace their entire military arsenal if forced to—but at enormous costs that Venezuela, with its current economy, could not assume without sacrificing other urgent needs, such as those required to overcome the humanitarian crisis.

The opposition must show FANB the maturity to pursue a foreign policy that places national sovereignty and popular wellbeing above irrational ideological commitments.

In a transition, the U.S. could demand that the Ministry of Defense break the technological dependency that ties FANB to Russian, Chinese, and Iranian suppliers, and return to U.S. providers. This would favor its industry and reduce the geopolitical risks of having a Venezuela armed with Russian S-300VM anti-aircraft missiles or Iranian drones across the Caribbean. FANB would see that as nothing less than handing its security over to Washington.

Of course, there is now a wide range of Western suppliers beyond the United Staes. But in the short term, the opposition needs to show both the FANB and Washington that it understands this dilemma and is capable of seeking solutions.

Foreign policy

Closely tied to that issue is the question of Venezuela’s international alignments in the post-chavista era. A Trumpist U.S. government will demand from the ex-opposition the same alignment it has had with Bolsonaro, Bukele, and Milei. In fact, such positions would be clearly and heavily rewarded at the polls by Venezuelans who lean to the far right due to the cultural trauma left by chavismo, the diaspora, and the humanitarian crisis. The FANB, however, would almost certainly find such alignments unacceptable.

The armed forces will not allow a reduction in trade with China or Russia—even if they have no objection, as they currently don’t, to U.S. capital settling in the country. The issue is not the coexistence of investments, but the risk of losing their Eastern lifeline. They might prove less resistant to redefining relations with the Middle East, though they would still demand condemnation of the genocide in Gaza and a distancing from Israel as a test of the ex-opposition’s reliability in foreign policy.

In Latin America, the red lines will be less clear. Washington will enable—and insist on—Venezuela’s return to the OAS, but the FANB will likely view the organization with suspicion, especially because of its time under Luis Almagro’s leadership. At the same time, the United States will have little interest in Venezuela rejoining Mercosur. But the FANB may demand a renewed strengthening of our ties with this regional integration bloc, specifically to rebuild trade relations with the region’s two largest economies: Argentina and Brazil.

Cuba, as a symbolic partner, will remain—though its influence over Venezuela is increasingly limited. For that reason, the FANB will not accept an explicit rupture. The same applies to the relationship with Daniel Ortega’s Nicaragua, which offers Venezuela neither gains nor losses. Bolivia, however, is a different case: Evo Morales’s MAS will likely not return to power in the medium or long term. Even so, if new episodes of human rights violations against Indigenous populations were to occur, as they did during Jeanine Áñez’s government, the FANB could demand a more critical stance than the one adopted at the time by Guaidó’s interim government.

Brazil will also present a particular challenge. Our southern neighbor will not only tend to be Venezuela’s economic center of gravity during redemocratization—it will do so under the leadership of Lula. Even if Lula himself does not remain in office, he will handpick a successor from the Workers’ Party (PT). As president, Lula has taken a pragmatic approach in dialogue with both the opposition and the PSUV in search of redemocratization. The PT, however, is a more ideologically driven organization and loyal to its “brother,” the PSUV.

Contrary to the image it has built of being subordinately aligned with the United States and the regional right, the opposition must show itself as a pragmatic, reliable actor—even one with common ground with the FANB.

In Argentina, if Milei is not reelected in 2027, a resurgent Peronism—oscillating between pragmatic factions toward Venezuela and factions more ideologically aligned with PSUV—would force María Corina Machado to find common ground for dialogue and negotiation with new leftist forces she may have to coexist with as a future government.

Finally, there is Colombia. Here, one scenario is the continuation—or not—of Gustavo Petro’s line in the coming years. Recently, Petro positioned himself against a potential U.S. intervention in Venezuela under the pretext of combating the Cartel of the Suns. While this may appear to be an ideological stance, it is in fact deeply pragmatic. Such military intervention could set an international legal precedent for U.S. interventions in countries like Colombia, Mexico, and other Central American neighbors also affected by drug trafficking. This could become an asset the FANB seeks to exploit, demanding that the ex-opposition collaborate with Colombia’s left under the banner of defending the sovereignty of both countries. Such collaboration would allow the FANB to build a legal framework to continue illicit business with drug-trafficking groups and to revisit its ties with the FARC along the border.

If, on the other hand, a neo-Uribista government were to return to power, the FANB would have incentives to push the ex-opposition to cool state-to-state ties with Colombia’s right. This, contrary to U.S. interests, may well become the weakest rope on which the future democratic government will have to balance. Sensitive issues for both FANB and U.S. material interests will be at stake there. Specifically, whether or not guerrilla groups and cross-border illegal economies in Colombia and Venezuela will be subordinated to a new national and international power arrangement. The recent proposal by Petro and Maduro to create a binational space between both countries is an issue on which the opposition must already begin to form a position—not an ideological one, but a pragmatic one. It must weigh its potential benefits and limits and establish its own stance that could contribute to building a healthier framework between the different actors whose interests converge around the border.

And in this, precisely, the opposition must learn from the case of Milei, who, after promising to break ties with Lula’s Brazil or with China, was forced by several reality checks to moderate. The opposition must show the FANB the maturity to pursue a foreign policy that places national sovereignty and popular wellbeing above irrational ideological commitments—even if that creates a difficult situation with Trumpism.

The problem of the issues left out

In a transition, a United States led by Trump will care little—or nothing—about a number of issues. For instance, on whether Venezuela holds trials or imposes sanctions on the military and civilian perpetrators of human rights violations. Little about advancing an agenda against drug trafficking, since the pursuit of the so-called Cartel of the Suns has more to do with legally justifying actions against chavismo than with actually dismantling a trafficking network. Little about the erosion of state capacity in the borderlands or in Guayana because in fact, such erosion might serve U.S. interests, as it would justify the deployment of its own regular and irregular security agents in the region to protect its mining investments. And little about preserving the biodiversity of the same Amazon currently being ravaged by business interests.

These issues will only make it to the negotiating table if brought up by the opposition. But if they do, the opposition will likely be pushed aside—and further confirm itself as a mere obstacle to a potential direct accommodation between Washington and the FANB. What, then, is to be done?

As we’ve argued before, the opposition needs Venezuela’s future democracy to inherit a political debate already in motion. But this debate cannot remain confined within the opposition itself—it must also include those still-democratic remnants of chavismo. And it must take place publicly, before the FANB and before society.

The opposition must show, starting now, that it understands the geopolitical challenges of tomorrow’s Venezuela and that, contrary to the image it has built of being subordinately aligned with the United States and the regional right, it can be a pragmatic, reliable actor—even one with common ground with the FANB.

But debates and image-building won’t be enough without a second element. As the opposition becomes an alternative government, it must be able to transform the mobilization capacity it has demonstrated in the streets and at the ballot box into a national and popular organization. With it, the opposition could secure a real voice and vote at the transition table alongside the U.S. and the FANB—an organization strong enough to threaten both sides by disrupting the stable continuity of their business and interests if it is not recognized as a legitimate player, one to which both Washington and the military must be accountable

But can such an organization be built, while the current FANB helps to prevent it as a repressive actor? That will be a debate for another day.