How Venezuelans See the Esequibo Campaign
In the slums of Caracas and in towns closer to the border with Guyana, people remain focused on their many other problems, and see the chauvinistic campaign as a bad thing
The Venezuelan government is increasing its spending by almost 40% in 2024 and seeking more oil projects. Meanwhile, schoolchildren are staying home.
The Venezuelan government expects its oil revenue to increase 27% in 2024 according to an unpublished annual budget proposal seen by Reuters. Spending is expected to be $20.5 billion: an increase of 39% compared to 2023.
Revenue from oil exports and taxes paid by PDVSA would cover 58% of total government spending, equivalent to about $11.9 billion, according to the document. PDVSA’s contributions this year were $9,340 million.
Meanwhile, also according to Reuters, Venezuela is hoping that BP, Chevron and Shell revive the Plataforma Deltana: an offshore project of 8 trillion cubic feet of gas reserves in the maritime border with the area disputed with Guyana.
Of course, things aren’t as bright for the people on the ground: according to the Red de Observadores Escolares, there were 3.89 school days per week on average in Venezuela between January and July 2023. 22.3% of the school calendar was lost in the first semester of the year. 30.3% of schools stop school activities due to failures in the water supply.
In the slums of Caracas and in towns closer to the border with Guyana, people remain focused on their many other problems, and see the chauvinistic campaign as a bad thing
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